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Since the collapse of the Communist bloc, Mongolia has 
pursued the independent foreign policy with balanced 
relations attached to the two great neighbors – Russia and 
China. Meanwhile, the search for a “third neighbor” (the 
United States, Japan and/or the collective community of 
democracies) has been seen as the alternative approach to 
the existing “neighbor-oriented” policy. The thesis argues 
that both approaches are not mutually exclusive schools of 
foreign policy, but rather constitute the common approach 
that is described within this research as “bufferism.”  
To present an alternative vision of the nation’s 
foreign policy orientation, the thesis covers the major 
schools of international relations and identifies the two 
major causes of policy: identity (based on constructivism) 
and interest (based on realism). As a nation, Mongolia 
faces the identity trilemma and the security dilemma, 
without much preference given to any of these options 
during the last decade. Hence appears the nation’s 
ambiguity in identity, security and economic development. 
The thesis puts the argument that without prioritizing one 
option, Mongolia faces the risk of degrading into a failing 
state isolated from the global affairs. Thus, the 
reconciliation of its identity and interest, as well as of 
its aspirations must lead to a rational choice of a Sino-
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During the opening ceremony of the Centennial Olympic 
Games in Atlanta in 1996, the anchor of the Russian state-
owned TV channel RTR made a rather “politically incorrect” 
comment about Mongolia, as the nation’s athletic team 
entered the stadium. His spontaneous words, roughly 
translated into English, as “Mongolia is indeed an 
independent country, for no one else depends on it,” have 
triggered an unexpected discontent among the Mongolian 
public, the majority of whom accepted it as an insult. The 
scandal was solved immediately after the formal apology by 
Eduard Sagallaev, the then-executive director of the RTR 
channel and was forgotten thereafter. Nevertheless, this 
comment captures the essence of the reality that small 
states have to face in the era of globalization; change the 
jargon from colloquial to academic – and these words will 
sound somewhat like “independence without interdependence 
results in a failing state.” Though by no parameters should 
Mongolia be described as a failing state, yet, the message 
that this comment brings should not be forgotten as the 
comment itself has been.  
The post-Cold War period was pivotal for Mongolia in 
finding its place on the world map. Along with political 
democratization and economic liberalization Mongolia 
launched what it had been longing to achieve for decades – 
an open, independent foreign policy with equidistant 
relations with its two neighbors while pursuing the 
attention of the third partner(s). Alongside the 
opportunities, Mongolia had also to accept the challenges 
of handling its own destiny. The perception of independence 
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that influenced Mongolia’s political and intellectual elite 
during this period is unique and derives from the legacies 
of the Communist era. Nearly eight decades of nominal 
independence under the Russian/Soviet protectorate had left 
a deep mark in Mongolia’s political mentality, frequently 
expressed in the desire to write the nation’s destiny 
without any form of foreign interference. Occasionally, 
this otherwise positive pattern of thought tends to be 
radicalized in a form of xenophobia and rejection of non-
native values and practices. Though this trend has never 
exerted substantial influence over the nation’s 
policymaking process, its traces nevertheless can be found 
in the founding philosophy of the contemporary Mongolian 
foreign policy – pursuit of a balance of power and a rather 
exaggerated self-perception of the role of buffer state.  
Thus, the objective of this thesis is to apply the 
theoretical clauses of major schools of international 
relations with relevance to the current geopolitical 
situation that Mongolia faces and introduce an alternative 
approach to formulate the most effective adjustment of the 
nation’s foreign policy orientation. Though the primary 
focus of the thesis research is academic, it is designed to 
provide policy recommendations for decision-making 
constituencies. While acknowledging all the major schools 
of international relations, I avoided the acceptance of any 
one of them in a pure form, and instead attempted to find a 
reconciliatory ground with stronger base on constructivism.  
A.  THESIS QUESTION  
Since the collapse of the Communist bloc, Mongolia has 
pursued an independent foreign policy with equidistant 
priorities attached to the two great neighbors – Russia and 
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China. Meanwhile, the search for a “third neighbor” (the 
United States, Japan and/or the collective community of 
democracies) has been seen as an alternative approach to 
the existing “neighbor-oriented” policy. The thesis argues 
that both approaches are not mutually exclusive schools of 
foreign policy, but rather constitute the common approach 
that is described within this research as “bufferism.” To 
present an alternative vision of the nation’s foreign 
policy orientation, the author enlists the major schools of 
international relations and identifies the two major causes 
of policymaking: identity (based on constructivism) and 
interest (based on realism). As a nation, Mongolia faces an 
identity trilemma and a security dilemma, without much 
preference given to any of these options during the last 
decade. Hence is the nation’s current ambiguity in 
identity, security and economic development. The thesis 
puts forward the argument that without prioritizing one 
option, Mongolia faces the risk of degrading into a failing 
state isolated from global affairs. Thus, the 
reconciliation of its identity and interest, as well as of 
its aspirations must lead to a rational choice of a Sino-
centric East Asian policy dimension over any other.       
B.  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The thesis is organized in a form of research 
comprised of the introduction, three chapters and the 
conclusion. Each chapter is an independent research unit, 
resulting from applying different scientific disciplines 
and methodologies.  
Introduction includes the thesis question and major 
propositions of the research work. 
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Chapter I provides the theoretical framework for the 
role of two main causal factors in foreign policy – 
identity and interest. The findings of this chapter are 
based on the major schools of international relations, 
namely constructivism, realism and liberalism. In the 
chapter, I correlate identity with the constructivist 
approach and interest with the realist approach, while 
applying some clauses of the liberal theory to analyze the 
correlation between the two factors. As part of the 
research findings, included in the chapter are my proposal 
for the classification of identity and interest, areas of 
their conflict and reconciliation. 
Chapter II explicitly covers Mongolia, its historical 
pattern of international relations and its contemporary 
pursuit of an independent foreign policy. The same typology 
of identity, interest and their correlation, used in the 
Chapter One, is applied in this chapter to analyze 
Mongolia’s quest for its proper place in the global 
affairs. The chapter identifies the identity trilemma and 
the security dilemma that Mongolia faces and provides the 
hypothesis of a risk attached to the continuation of this 
ambiguity. The chapter addresses the phenomenon of 
Sinophobia persistent in Mongolian society as a socially 
constructed myth hindering the nation’s more thorough 
identification and interest affiliation with East Asia, and 
stipulates the need for “demythization.” Overall, the 
chapter stresses the growing importance of the East Asian 
dimension in Mongolia’s foreign policy. 
Chapter III departs from a state-centered view of the 
regional trends and provides a more liberal-
internationalist approach to emerging cooperation in East 
5 
Asia. For that purpose, the existing solid organizations, 
such as the ASEAN and its regional dialogue forum (ARF), as 
well as the embryonic mechanisms are reviewed. My argument 
is that while East Asia still remains a long distance 
behind Europe or North America in the development of 
regionalism, the pattern of globalization through 
regionalization has become inevitable. Also the 
construction of a common East Asian identity for the 
pursuit of each state’s self-interest is underway. Thus, 
the main finding of the chapter is that in East Asia, much 
like the European or North American communities, fusion of 
all three approaches – constructivism, realism and 
liberalism – becomes increasingly visible and viable. 
Conclusion offers the incorporation of the findings of 
the three chapters into a policy recommendation for 
Mongolian foreign policy constituencies, stipulating that 
the reconciliation of Mongolia’s identity an interest 
inevitably demands adjustment to the existing “balanced 
relations” doctrine and emphasis on the East Asian 















































II. ROLE OF IDENTITY AND INTEREST IN  
FOREIGN POLICY 
 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Defining the causal factors in foreign policy depends 
on the perception of the international system itself, and 
the level of analysis used in the study. Two factors 
described as causal within the context of this research – 
identity and interest – represent two different schools – 
constructivism and realism, and require two different 
levels of analysis – the system and the domestic level. 
This chapter looks at identity and interest as separate 
factors in foreign policy, defines their types and 
components, and attempts to specify which one acts as the 
primary factor behind a state’s behavior. For that purpose, 
the chapter looks at the constructivist view on identity 
and the neo-liberal view on ideas (herein identity is 
included as a distinct form of idea) and compares them to 
the realist view on interest. The chapter names the neo-
liberal approach as having a reconciling role between the 
conflicting views on identity vs. interest.    
B. IDENTITY AS A FACTOR IN FOREIGN POLICY 
1.  Theoretical Framework 
Identity, as collective self-perception of a group, 
serves as an idea in foreign policy. The definition of what 
should be called identity is highly controversial – from 
exclusively referring to cultural identity to encompassing 
political and systemic ones. Anthony Smith defends the 
narrow definition of identity and stipulates: 
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The notion of “identity” has received 
considerable attention, not least in 
political science and international 
relations literature. Here, however, it 
relates mainly to a sense of community based 
on history and culture, rather than to any 
collectivity or to the concept of ideology.1  
 
Nonetheless, Smith agrees to the wider perception of 
identity, especially “in its relevance to the disciplines 
of political science and international relations.”2 In this 
context, identity is viewed as a set of socially 
constructed ideas (self-perception) that serves as a causal 
factor in foreign policy. Therefore, for the 
conceptualization of identity I address the constructivist 
approach and use the examples of variations within it.  
Constructivists reject the notion that reality 
reflects objective forces of nature and emphasize that 
political orders are socially constructed. They study “how 
norms, cultures, and debates about identity influence the 
development of collectively-accepted international rules 
and practices and how these international rules and 
practices affect domestic politics and agree that the 
spread of collective ideas, in the form of collective 
learning, adaptation, or socialization, is a key mechanism 
in the transformation of and reproduction of international 
political structures.”3 Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro link 
the social construction to interest and the means to 
achieve it. In their interpretation, “actors’ conceptions 
                     1 Anthony D. Smith (1986): The Ethnic Origins of Nations. Blackwell 
Publishers, p. 14.  
2 Smith (1986), p. 14. 
3 Anne L. Clunan (2001): Identity and the Emergence of National 
Interest in Post-Soviet Russia. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of 
California-Berkeley, Chapter 1, paragraph 9.  
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of [such] methods may be shaped by such social structures 
as national identity, norms of scientific knowledge.”4 
Alexander Wendt links collective identity formation to the 
realist approach of international system at the systemic 
level: 
Self-help security systems evolve from 
cycles of interaction in which each party 
acts in ways that the other feels are 
threatening to the self, creating 
expectations that the other is not to be 
trusted.5 
 
Wendt stipulates that the construction of identity 
results from reiterated interaction with other states, 
thus, “security identities take the form of roles that 
states play.”6 Accordingly, a state’s identity results from 
its treatment by other states. Hence, Wendt’s 
constructivism resembles the realist school in two ways – 
recognition of the international system as anarchic, and 
derivation of a state’s identity from external factors.  
Ernst Haas, on the contrary, credits domestic factors 
more than the international ones in creating a national 
identity. As his theoretical proposition stipulates,  
“internal characteristics of a state, often in conjunction 
with desires for particular world roles or domestic 
political power, produce a state’s identity.”7 In defining 
                     4 Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro (1996): “Norms, Identity and Their 
Limits: A Theoretical Reprise,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed. (1996): 
The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. 
Columbia University Press, p. 463. 
5 Alexander Wendt (1992): “Anarchy is What States make of It,” in 
International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2/1992, p. 406. 
6 Alexander Wendt (1994): “Collective Identity Formation and the 
International States,” in American Political Science Review, Vol. 
88/1994, pp. 384-396. 
7 Clunan (2001), Chapter 1, Paragraph 28. 
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whether national identities create nation-states, Haas 
notes that identity creation is “a task that political 
leaders set themselves in trying to make their society 
cohere.”8 Haas also introduces the concept of “national 
myth,” as an indication of a more integrated society. His 
definition of “national myth” is: 
 
A core of ideas and claims about selfhood 
commonly accepted by all the socially 
mobilized. Put differently, the national 
myth represents those ideas, values, and 
symbols that most citizens accept despite 
their being divided into competing 
ideological groups.9 
 
For Haas, national identity is based on “symbols and 
ideas of distinction and uniqueness, including status, 
religion, race and language” as well as “abstract ideas 
about law, cosmology, origins, futures and science.”10 He 
stresses that “national identities are chosen, not 
generally implanted, and they are subject to change.”11 
Hence, Haas’ understanding of the social construction of 
identity can lead to the policy implications akin to 
liberalism: emphasis on identity creation for the purpose 
of fostering cooperation among states.  
Since I equate identity with ideas, the theoretical 
framework for this approach is also found in the neo-
liberal school. Coming from this background, Judith 
Goldstein and Robert Keohane challenge the traditional 
                     8 Ernst B. Haas (1997): Nationalism, Liberalism, and Progress, Vol. 
1. Cornell University Press, p. 29.  
9 Haas (1997), p. 43. 
10 Haas (1997), pp. 23-24. 
11 Haas (1997), p. 39. 
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realist approach to policy-making with strict adherence to 
foreign policy as an outcome of a rational choice of states 
as unitary actors based upon their interests. At the same 
time, they also challenge the reflectivist approach of 
attributing the policy outcome exclusively to ideas without 
examining them empirically. In sum, they describe their 
proposition as “ideas matter for policy, even when human 
beings behave rationally to achieve their ends.”12  
In other words, despite the existence of an anarchic 
international system, where each state is a unitary actor 
behaving with a purpose of maximizing its power defined as 
interest, at the decision-making stage foreign policy is 
also influenced by a set of ideas and beliefs, shared by a 
certain constituency domestically and internationally. 
Goldstein and Keohane put the question: Do ideas have an 
impact on political outcomes, and if so, under what 
conditions?13 Their arguments supporting and explaining the 
above-mentioned question is that first, ideas, classified 
by their scope as world views (exemplar case – major 
religions), principled beliefs (human rights) and causal 
beliefs (monetary theory), “serve as switchmen, not only by 
turning action onto certain tracks rather than others, but 
also by obscuring the other tracks from the agent’s view.”14 
Second, they suggest that there are three causal pathways 
through which ideas can hold the potential of influencing 
                     
12 Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (1993): “Ideas and Foreign 
Policy: An Analytical Framework,” in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. 
Keohane, ed. (1993): Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions 
and Political Change. Cornell University Press, p. 5. 
13 Goldstein and Keohane (1993), p. 11. 
14 Goldstein and Keohane (1993), p. 12. 
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policy outcomes – ideas as road maps, ideas as focal points 
and glue, and ideas institutionalized.15   
Among these, the first case presents ideas as a 
normative or causal set of focused beliefs that arise from 
“conditions of uncertainties about the actors’ interests 
and how to maximize them.”16 In the second case the ideas 
are portrayed as a coordinator serving as key to a game’s 
outcome that “alleviates coordination problems arising from 
the absence of unique equilibrium solutions.”17 Finally, the 
third case shows that “ideas can have a lasting influence 
on politics when institutions intervene,”18 and that these 
institutions are often shaped and socially constructed 
under the impact of ideas. In sum, Goldstein and Keohane 
argue:  
 
Policy changes can be influenced by ideas 
both because new ideas emerge and as a 
result of changes in underlying conditions 
affecting the impact of existing ideas.19     
 
The proposition of the influence of ideas on foreign 
policy, although recognizing the importance of the system 
environment in decision-making (Goldstein and Keohane do 
not deny the existence of the self-help system and 
rationality of actors’ behavior as a basis of international 
relations), nevertheless identifies ideas as an important 
factor that can influence the policy. Ideas, regardless of 
their origin and scope (i.e. major world religions or 
                     15 Goldstein and Keohane (1993), p. 12. 
16 Goldstein and Keohane (1993), p. 16. 
17 Goldstein and Keohane (1993), p. 17. 
18 Goldstein and Keohane (1993), p. 20. 
19 Goldstein and Keohane (1993), p. 30. 
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domestic political view), do not affect the system but the 
state, especially its various constituencies, including the 
leaders. Therefore, the proposition is put at the domestic 
(pathways of direction and institutionalization), as well 
as the individual (pathway of policy coordination) levels 
of analysis. Within the context of this thesis, the former 
will be emphasized as the leading factor in contemporary 
Mongolian policymaking. 
Goldstein and Keohane bring an intriguing discussion 
on the relation of ideas (within our context - identity) 
and interest; whether one of these two factors serves as 
the causal one and the other merely intervenes to shape the 
output. On the one hand, “ideas matter, as a result of a 
system of interacting causes of which they are a part,” and 
ideas “have lasting influence on policy when institutions 
intervene.”20 Hence, the causal effect of institutions is 
limited to only one of the three pathways through which 
ideas influence policy.  
On the other hand, Goldstein and Keohane, by 
challenging not only the rationalist approach, but also 
reflectivism as well, portray ideas not as the cause, but 
instead present it as a modifier to the primary cause, 
which is the state’s interest. This interpretation derives 
from the hypothesis that ideas serve as three different 
pathways to policy outcome.  
However, it is much more likely that ideas do serve as 
the cause of policymaking, though not the sole one, but are 
interchangeable with the interest. Depending on the 
objective of the research, we can talk of ideas as 
intermediary to the causal factor – the interest, or vice 
                     20 Goldstein and Keohane (1993), pp. 30, 20. 
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versa. In our case, I argue that ideas – hence identity – 
serve as a factor of equal importance as interest. Hence, I 
disagree with the functional approach, which argues that 
ideas themselves do not play a causal role, by suggesting 
that ideas as well as interests have causal weight in 
explanations of human action. Thus, assuming that 
institutions (as a key element shaping the longevity of an 
idea), equilibrium (presence or absence of a single 
equilibrium that influences the impact of an idea) and 
domestic situation (positive and negative developments) – 
are the intermediaries in policy outcomes, I define 
identity as the primary factor behind a state’s behavior. 
2.  Typology of Identity  
Tsedendamba Batbayar describes overarching 
characteristics of the Mongolian identity as a product of 
both geography and culture21; I borrow his methodology for 
this research in a slightly altered fashion and use it to 
classify the identity of any national group and apply it to 
a broader analysis of the patterns of foreign policy and 
international relations. Here I distinguish the identity as 
primordial, crystallized and constructed.    
a.  Identity Primordial: Product of Geography 
The basic perception of a national identity stems 
from its territorial location. Hence occur the continental 
typologies, such as “European nation,” “Oriental nation,” 
                     21 Dr. Batbayar discusses identity as product of geography and 
culture; he credits culture for shaping Mongolia’s nomadic heritage and 
geography for constructing its geopolitical position. However, I borrow 
this methodology and apply a reversed causal mechanism: herein the 
geography serves as the creator of primordial identity, culture as the 
basis for crystallized identity, and politics as the foundation for 
constructed identity; see Tsedendamba Batbayar (2002): “Mongolia’s 
Foreign Policy in the 1990s: New Identities, New Challenges,” in 
Regional Security Issues and Mongolia, Vol. 17/2002. The Institute for 
Strategic Studies Press, pp. 19-30. 
15 
etc. Especially in cases where the dominant ethnic group(s) 
of a particular nation-state consider(s) itself an 
autochthonous ethnie,22 geography plays a crucial role in 
defining its identity. Most of the European states have 
constituted such a primordial identity. For example, groups 
like the Germans, the Bohemians and the Hellenes, which 
became the dominant ethnie in Germany, Czech Lands and 
Greece respectively, consider their identity primordial, 
e.g. defined by their territorial location. In East Asia, 
the Han Chinese have a similar type of identity. Geography 
approximates the basic lifestyle of the people sharing 
common primordial identities; thus the “nomads,” the 
“bedouins,” the “sedentary peoples,” etc. Ethnic or 
linguistic similarities also contribute to the formation of 
a “primordialist” view on identity. Notions like the 
“Germanic,” the “Slavic,” or the “Turkic” people, are to be 
viewed as primordial identity and a weak bonding factor per 
se, but are frequently enlisted as means of constructing a 
new identity serving a particular political goal (which has 
not been the case of the first one, but has been the case 
of the last two).      
However, if the dominant ethnie is not an 
autochthonous population but are considered immigrants, the 
primordial or geographic identity tends to fade away and be 
replaced by a more distant ethno-linguistic affiliation. 
Such is the case of the Magyars and the Anatolian Turks; 
though as modern nation-states Hungary and Turkey are 
considered to be the European and Western Asian entities 
respectively, the dominant groups are the descendants of 
the Siberian and Central Asian nomadic peoples. In both 
                     22 An autochthonous ethnie is an ethnic group perceived as indigenous 
to a particular geographic region; see Smith (1986), p. 23. 
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occasions, primordial identities are not linked to 
geography, and the geography represents rather a different 
type of identity – the cultural one.  
Though Eric Hosbawm’s proposition on the nature 
and origin of nations describes them as “neither a primary 
nor an unchanging entity,”23 one could assume that the 
primordial identity plays some role in shaping national 
statehood at the earliest stage of its formation. However, 
such a proposition could not be falsifiable, as Hobsbawm 
notes further:   
 
[Nation] belongs exclusively to a 
particular, and historically recent, period. 
It is a social entity only insofar as it 
relates to a certain kind of modern 
territorial state, the nation state.24   
 
Thus, in general, primordial identity tends not 
to evolve into a major factor of policy for nation-states; 
for the reason that the latter is a too modern and dynamic 
institution to acquire such archaic features.  
b.  Identity Crystallized: Product of Culture 
     The second type of identity bears a more profound 
impact on states. I describe it as a crystallized identity, 
e.g. the type of identity that is formed throughout a 
continuous span of history as a product of long-lasting 
cultural impacts, such as religion, literature traditions, 
shared philosophical and ethical beliefs, etc. It is this 
type of identity that loosely can be equated to a broader 
notion of “civilization.” Hence, we describe the existing 
                     23 E. J. Hobsbawm (1992): Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: 
Programme, Myth, Reality. Cambridge University Press, p. 9. 
24 Hobsbawm (1992), p. 9.  
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nations of Western and Central, and to some degree, Eastern 
Europe as bearers of the common “Western” cultural identity 
(civilization). With the same criteria China, Japan and 
Korea are classified into a “Sinitic” cultural realm, based 
on Confucian/Buddhist tradition. The Middle Eastern, or 
Islamic, cultural area also encompasses a nearly contiguous 
landmass and shares strong commonalties across different 
ethnic and linguistic realms. Thus, in general, bearers of 
the same cultural identity are also bound by their 
geographical proximity, but belonging to a national or 
trans-national entity occasionally blurs geographical 
distance. Hence, the North Americans view themselves (and 
are classified by the scholars) as part of the “Western” 
civilization.25  
It is this type of identity that constitutes the 
fundamentals of an idea as described in the first section 
of this chapter. Cultural, or crystallized identity, which 
I equate with the definition of a “civilization,” serves in 
the capacity of the pathways – road map, focal point and 
institutionalization, though the latter one also largely 
derives from the constructed identity, which will be 
discussed next.        
c.  Identity Constructed: Product of Politics 
     The formation and rise of nation-states and 
subsequent dominance of the Westphalian system assisted in 
the creation of yet another type of identity, transcending 
ethnic, geographic and civilizational boundaries, which I 
                     25 For further references on North American identity, see Samuel P. 
Huntington (1996): The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World 
Order. Simon & Schuster; and Arnold J. Toynbee (1948): The Study of 
History, Abridgement of Volumes I-VI by D. C. Somerwell (1987).   
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label “constructed.”26 The major impulse for this type of 
identity was the rise of universally (or at least, broadly) 
shared political ideologies in the 19-20th centuries, such 
as Marxism, Liberalism, Nazism etc. Throughout the Cold War 
period, the majority of the states that embraced Marxist 
ideology and were ruled by the Communist party constructed 
a common identity. Likewise, the non-communist world 
created the notion of the “free world.” Inclusive in this 
“free world,” but not necessarily overlapping, was the 
community of democracies that shared even a closer identity 
within a larger non-communist bloc. Extreme nationalism 
coupled with militarism has created another, though short-
lived identity in the period between First and Second World 
Wars – the so-called “Berlin-Rome-Tokyo” axis, encompassing 
the three regimes with originally diverse ideologies, and 
their allies. Constructed identity, therefore, does not 
possess longevity and tends to fade away after the founding 
ideology diminishes. Thus, in the contemporary period it is 
hard to trace such strong, politically constructed identity 
groups of nations, except the rapidly expanding community 
of democracies.  
However, there are several examples of inter-
connected identities, evolving from cultural to political 
and vice versa. Islamic fundamentalism today should be 
perceived as a political ideology and, therefore, bearers 
of such an idea constitute a group of populaces embracing a 
common constructed identity. However, the roots of this 
identity lie not in a political doctrine per se, but in an 
                     26 This thesis describes all types of identity as social 
construction. However, for this particular type I specifically use the 
word “constructed” denoting a construction of the modern period that is 
based on socio-political objectives of the respective national 
governments. Therefore, it should not be confused with a broader 
interpretation of constructivism.    
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exclusive cultural/religious affiliation. On the other 
hand, group identity of such entities as the community of 
post-Soviet nations (the Commonwealth of Independent 
States), the British Commonwealth and La Francophonie, all 
of which have the common characteristics of the post-
colonial establishments, evolved from a political 
construction into a cultural crystallization over time. In 
all the cases, commonly shared language (non-native, but 
nevertheless principal), cultural and societal practices, 
as well as educational systems (for example, the notion of 
a “Francophone” person, or that of a Homo Sovieticus) 
became the bonding factors for the nations of otherwise 
diverse ethnic, religious and geographic identities. In 
such cases, e.g. when the constructed identity evolves into 
a cultural one, it tends to last longer due to the nature 
of cultural affiliations. 
 d.  Divergent and Convergent Identities               
 Construction of identity is the basis of 
nationalism, and thus, various forms of nationalism emerge 
from the types of identity. Primordiality serves as the 
basis for the development of romantic nationalism (sometimes 
referred to as organic nationalism or identity nationalism), 
which is the form of nationalism in which the state derives 
political legitimacy as a natural ("organic") consequence of 
race. Opposed to this, ethnic nationalism, in which the 
state derives political legitimacy from historical, cultural 
or hereditary groupings (ethnicities), most likely derives 
from the cultural crystallization of identity. Both forms of 
nationalism reflect the Romanticism and are opposed to the 
Enlightenment rationalism. The third type, civic 
nationalism, e.g. the form of nationalism in which, 
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according to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the state derives 
political legitimacy from the active participation of its 
citizenry through the "will of the people" manifested in 
"political representation," tends to be the result of a 
political construction.27 This form of nationalism lies 
within the traditions of rationalism and liberalism.  
However, it would be an oversimplification to 
point out that only the constructed identity creates modern 
civic nationalism and others do not. A basic consideration 
for successful state-building is how the different 
identities correlate with each other. The three types of 
identity persist within modern nation-states in multiple 
variations. The three types can be all inclusive, thus 
convergent, or mutually exclusive, hence divergent. The 
state encompassing the former one has a solid international 
position whereas the state encompassing the latter one 
tends to face an identity dilemma or trilemma, thus 
creating complexity in policymaking pathways. Most of the 
Western European states can be classified as nations with 
convergent identity, inclusive of all three types – 
primordial (geography: European), crystallized 
(civilization: Western, or Christian) and constructed 
(politico-economic system: liberal democracy and free 
market economy). The Persian Gulf states probably share the 
same convergent identity – Arabic origins, Muslim 
civilization and traditionalist/monarchist order.  
On the contrary, nations with multiple 
identities, which I describe as “divergent,” generally 
correspond to what Samuel Huntington defines as “torn 
                     27 Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762): The Social Contract and Discourses, 
translated [from the English] and introduced by G. D. H. Cole (1950). 
E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., pp. 45-54. 
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countries.”28 A primary example of this type is Russia, the 
national identity of which is dispersed among the three 
versions of its self-perception: Slavic (primordial), 
Christian/Orthodox (crystallized) and Eurasian 
(constructed). In addition to the latter one, constructed 
throughout the long span of the Russian Imperial past, 
there are two more politically motivated constructed 
identities persistent in the contemporary Russian society: 
the above-mentioned “Soviet,” (now fading and gradually 
being transformed into a Eurasian identity) and the 
emerging “Western” one (largely a construction of the 
liberal camp in Russian politics, which is likely to 
prevail in the future due to its correspondence with 
Russia’s national interest). One also can name Turkey as a 
nation possessing divergent identity, which has found an 
even stronger reflection in its foreign policy. Identity of 
this nation includes Central Asian (primordial), Middle 
Eastern/Muslim (crystallized) and Western (constructed) 
ones. Of these, the cultural affiliation with the Muslim 
world must be the strongest one, but due to the policy of 
secularization and guided modernization, the new secular 
culture had become dominant over the traditional one and 
thus, the constructed identity has undergone the process of 
crystallization.           
A unique example of a nation with divergent 
identity is the United States. From its birth, it 
encompasses the Western Hemispheric (primordial), 
Western/Christian (crystallized) and democratic 
(constructed) identities. Throughout its evolution as a 
political, military and economic superpower, the United 
                     28 Huntington (1996), pp. 139-141. 
22 
States has acquired several other diverging identities: 
geographically, notions of an Atlantic and a Pacific power; 
and culturally, the cosmopolitan/universalist perception of 
the self. However, it should not be viewed as a “torn” 
state, since the primary difference of the divergent 
identity of the United States from that of Russia or Turkey 
is that it has the capacity to project power and influence 
in all the above-mentioned directions. Therefore, the 
diverging identities of the United States are mutually 
complementing and not mutually competing.  
Divergent identity can be interpreted both as a 
positive and a negative factor in foreign policy. The 
convergent identity - if shared with neighboring states - 
creates solid regional institutions to promote security and 
economic cooperation. Compelling evidence is the European 
Union. In the capacity of ideas, the divergent identity 
provides the state with multiple pathways of policymaking. 
On the one hand, it is a positive factor because it 
broadens the equilibrium, thus, creating more opportunity 
to maneuver within the complex international system. 
However, a state must possess the power to exploit multiple 
policy choices, and yet, with the exception of the United 
States there is hardly any state with such capacity. 
Therefore, the mutually exclusive, competing divergence of 
identity tends more to complicate the options rather than 
enrich them. The civilizationally “torn” nations thus can 
become the politically “torn” states, with domestic 
constituencies engaging in a struggle for adoption of one 
or another particular foreign policy agenda. Russia’s 
contemporary political spectrum, ranging from the statist-
nationalist camp pursuing the “Eurasianist” doctrine to the 
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liberal internationalist camp advocating thorough 
Westernization, might be an example of a political division 
based on foreign policy issues.29 Hence, it reveals the 
importance to consider the second causal factor of foreign 
policy – the interest, and thus switch into a realist 
approach to the international system.        
C.  INTEREST AS A FACTOR IN FOREIGN POLICY 
1.  Theoretical Framework 
Many authors in the realist camp explain the rationale 
for behavior of great powers. Among these, the rigid, 
classical realism a-la Morgenthau would have difficulty 
providing a solid theoretical background for the analysis 
of national interest in its correlation with such 
constructed notions, as identity. Therefore, although I 
depend on Hans Morgenthau’s fundamental definitions of 
interest and rationality of foreign policy, I rely mostly 
on John J. Mearsheimer’s neo-realist propositions about the 
nature of the international system as well as of the states 
as actors. He stipulates that “great powers vie with each 
other for power and strive for hegemony,”30 and that “the 
structure of the international system, not the particular 
characteristics of individual great powers causes them to 
act offensively and to seek hegemony.”31 By this proposition 
Mearsheimer distances himself from the realm of classical 
realism, which, according to Morgenthau, claims that 
“states invariably behave aggressively because they have a 
                     29 For further reference on identity perceptions across Russia’s 
political spectrum, see Clunan (2001); and A. P. Tsygankov (2003): 
“Mastering Space in Eurasia: Russia's Geopolitical Thinking After the 
Soviet Break-up,” in Communist and Postcommunist Studies. No. 1/2003, 
pp. 101-127. 
 30 John J. Mearsheimer (2001): The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. 
Norton, p. 29. 
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will to power hardwired into them,”32 and notes that “the 
principal motive behind great-power behavior is survival.”33  
Mearsheimer’s logic to support this thesis is based on 
five assumptions that describe the nature of the 
international system, namely, the anarchic nature of the 
international system; inherent possession of military 
capability by great powers; uncertainty of other states’ 
intentions; importance of survival as a primary goal of 
great powers; and, the nature of great powers themselves as 
rational actors.34 Considering these assumptions the axioms 
for his proposition, i.e. taking them as basic facts 
unchallenged by critique, Mearsheimer leads us into five 
consequent modes of states’ behavior, namely, their fear of 
one another; their access of capability to attack one 
another; their engagement in political competition, which 
is, by its nature, far more destructive and dangerous than 
the economic intercourse; their aim to survive; and, their 
mode of action according to their self-interest without 
subordinating it to the interests of other states or common 
interests of the international community.35 In other words, 
in a system where there is no world government to provide a 
prescription for a set of behaviors and in which the major 
actors, i.e. the states, possess paramount sovereignty, it 
is natural for such rational actors as states, and in 
particular, great powers, to behave in a manner that would 
reciprocate mutual struggle for power, often assisted by 
                     31 Mearsheimer (2001), p. 53. 
32 Hans J. Morgenthau (1948): Politics Among Nations: The Struggle 
for Power and Peace, Fifth Edition (1973). Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., p. 9. 
33 Morgenthau (1948/1973), p. 10. 
34 Mearsheimer (2001), p. 54. 
35 Mearsheimer (2001), pp. 32-33. 
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their aggressive measures taken to grant their own survival 
as well as a quest for more power.  
All five above-mentioned assumptions can be traced to 
a single causal factor of state sovereignty. Sovereignty 
that exercises paramount impact causes the system to 
maintain its anarchic order instead of being reshaped into 
one of the two hypothetical patterns: world government 
(single supra-national actor) or elimination of states’ 
functions by non-state actors (sub-national actors). 
Although modern trends in world politics allow both to 
appear as possible challenges to the nation-state-based 
system, states are not likely to give up their sovereignty 
in many vital spheres. It should also be noted that these 
two trends basically create varying scopes and limits of 
sovereignty, which is true for great powers and small 
states alike.  In addition, sovereignty makes the states’ 
intentions unknown to others; it justifies states to be the 
only legitimate unit of the system to possess offensive 
military capability; and because of the sovereignty’s 
prevailing supremacy over other attributes of nation-
states, survival, both physical and structural, remains the 
main concern for states, i.e. it is the factor that causes 
the phenomenon of fear. Noteworthy, neo-liberals like 
Keohane and George also name physical survival as an 
“irreducible national interest.”36 Since there can be 
constraints on sovereignty, its actual scope may vary, 
which leads to the states’ behavior of vying for more 
power, i.e. for more unrestricted sovereignty, including 
the potential of dominating all other states within the 
                     36 Robert O. Keohane and Alexander L. George (1980): “The Concepts of 
National Interests: Uses and Limitations,” in Alexander L. George 
(ed.), Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy. Westview Press, 
p. 223. 
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system, defined as hegemony.37 Considering the scope of 
state sovereignty that reveals itself in five 
characteristics of the system the causal factor, we can as 
well conclude that the behavioral mode of states, described 
above as five consequences of the system nature, is the 
system’s output.  
Given that the scope of sovereignty can vary from 
state to state, influenced by other factors, such as 
geographical location, comparative military strength and 
power distribution among major actors, state behavior also 
varies despite the generalization that great powers seek 
unrestrained power and thus, behave aggressively. Factors 
listed above that influence the behavior of states 
constitute one category, which can have geopolitical (an 
example - difference of behavior between that of the two 
powers separated by large water masses and that of the two 
contiguous land powers),38 socioeconomic (domestic 
capability to sustain the growth of military strength 
and/or support of the regime), military or even political 
(for instance, international treaties or membership in 
alliances that force the states to abide in certain norms 
of behavior despite their real intentions) characteristics. 
These factors, which serve as intervening variables of the 
proposition, set the limits and, consequently, the scopes 
of state sovereignty, and therefore, there is no 
possibility for an unrestrained aggressive mode of 
behavior, that otherwise would be exercised by great powers 
in their pursuit of hegemony.  
                     37 Mearsheimer (2001), p. 40. 
38 Mearsheimer (2001), p. 44. 
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This pattern of thought, laid by Mearsheimer, thus 
closes the circle and leads us to a paradoxical conclusion: 
sovereignty of states creates the anarchic nature of the 
international system, which allows other intervening 
factors to challenge and set restraints in the execution of 
unchallenged sovereignty, thus, preventing the major 
actors, i.e. great powers, from being engaged in continuous 
violent struggle for hegemony. In other words, it is the 
anarchy that sets the world order in its present shape. The 
main cause for states’ behavior, therefore, lies within the 
two above-mentioned variables, the scope of sovereignty and 
its limits (advantages/disadvantages); thus, no reference 
to sub-system level units is made in defining this 
phenomenon. Analysis for this research, therefore, is 
conducted at the system level and, with his logic and 
subsequent reasoning based on accurate calculation of 
variables, one can predict the behavior of a particular 
great power. Within the framework of this research an 
attempt at such prediction for several major powers has 
been made.  
2.  Components of Interest 
Identification of interest for a state must focus on 
the assumption that the state is the single actor within 
the international system, therefore, its typological 
classification will also refer to the components that are 
collectively recognized by all the constituencies within a 
state. However, the role of domestic constituencies should 
not be underestimated in formulating the interest – when 
the latter prevails, analysis must recognize the presence 
of the individual/bureaucratic factors, e.g. enter the 
domestic level of analysis. In general, I propose the 
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classification of a state’s interests as rational and 
irrational. Generally, though not exclusively, the former 
is based on the single-actor proposition, whereas the 
latter is based on the influence of the domestic 
constituencies.  
a.  Rational Component of Interest: Security 
     For states, one interest that can be described as 
the single common denominator is physical survival, which 
is referred to as “irreducible national interest” by 
Keohane and George.39 Hans Morgenthau places security as the 
primary cause for the behavior of the states.40 Though the 
definition of security varies from state to state in 
accordance to the particular political agenda, individual 
and/or bureaucratic interpretations, most states commonly 
share the perception of the following as their security 
interest: political independence, territorial integrity and 
sovereignty within its boundaries.41  
Direct threat to the physical security of the 
state, therefore, derives from another state and/or 
coalition of states. Therefore, the foreign policy of a 
state aims at achieving its protection by enlisting the 
alliance. However, domestic factors also challenge the 
above-mentioned three dimensions of security: for instance, 
the territorial integrity and sovereignty are often 
threatened by separatism. Even in such a case, the aim of 
foreign policy is not much different from the previous 
example – a state strives to receive the assistance of its 
                     
39 Keohane and George (1980), p. 223. 
40 Morgenthau (1948/1973), p. 10. 
41 Ravdan Bold (2000): ”The Security of Small States: Option for 
Mongolia,” in Regional Security Issues and Mongolia. Vol., 9, The 
Institute for Strategic Studies Press, p. 21. 
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allies. In sum, protection of the status quo and 
preservation of itself is the primary rational interest of 
a state, toward which it directs its foreign policy.     
b.  Rational Component of Interest: Economy 
     On the first impression, identification of the 
economy as one of the rational components of interest must 
rely primarily on the liberal interpretation of the world 
system more than the realist one. Nonetheless, in three 
capacities the economy serves as the causal factor of 
foreign policy based on the rational, realist calculation. 
First is the perception of economic strength as a 
foundation for military power. The collapse of the former 
Soviet Union is caused by, among other factors, its 
crumbling economy that could not sustain the arms race with 
another superpower. On the contrary, the United States’ 
enormous economic strength enables its military to maintain 
an unparalleled might. Even for smaller countries, 
weakening of the economy causes downsizing the military and 
its associated expenditure.  
Second is the role of national priority in the 
absence and/or weakening of the direct security threat – 
though the pure example of this category is nearly 
impossible to find. There are, nevertheless, states that 
perceive no direct security threat within the framework of 
existing international and regional security order; 
Mongolia, as will be described later, falls into this 
category of nations. Other examples might include Canada 
and the Western European states, which enjoy security 
alliance or full-fledged friendly relations with their 
neighbors.  
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Third is the perception of the economy as indirect 
catalyst of security threats per se – e.g. the 
understanding that the economic underdevelopment and 
poverty will ultimately cause threats to a state’s physical 
security, aggregated in various forms of the loss of 
sovereignty. The latter may involve both foreign invasion 
and internal strife. Besides religious affiliation, perhaps 
this is one possible explanation of the difference in 
behavior of the Quebecois (Canada) and Chechen (Russia) 
separatism and the degree of threat that each movement 
poses to the security of the respective state.     
Hence, economy is an integral component of 
national interest based on both traditional and non-
traditional perception of security.         
c. Irrational Components of Interest: Prestige   
 Interest can also receive some irrational 
components. By defining some “irrational,” I refer to the 
types of perception of interest that exceeds the rational 
understanding of security and economic development. Within 
this context, the line between irrational interest and 
identity blurs; the difference between constructivism and 
realism fades away. Moreover, irrational interest is itself 
an idea, which serves in one of the three capacities 
defined earlier as pathways for policy-making. The 
difficulty in identifying the irrational component of 
interest lies in the fact that it is almost 
indistinguishable from the two other factors of foreign 
policy: rational interest and identity. In the former case, 
by the notion of greatness and ambition of power 
projection, the great powers extract economic benefit and 
protect their security orbit at a distance from their 
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physical boundaries. In the latter case, states exploit 
their identity for narrowing the pathway of policy choices. 
In this sense, there should be no need to identify 
irrational interest as a separate causal factor. Therefore, 
the irrational components of interest can be disregarded as 
the interests of a state as single actor and viewed as 
ideas carried by the individual and/or bureaucracy levels. 
However, such an approach would undermine the very logic of 
irrationality: how would a set of ideas, which is a product 
of a rational construction that influences the rational 
decision-making on the part of domestic constituencies, be 
equaled to irrational interest? And the next logical 
question is, can there be an interest that is irrational, 
or is it merely an oxymoron?  
The argument I bring here is that there are some 
aspects of an idealistic view on the world, that without 
being institutionalized as a set of ideas, effects the 
behavior of states and their societies on the international 
scene. It might not be a direct result of the willed action 
of policymakers, but a behavioral trend persistent in that 
particular society for generations. In such cases, this 
trend is generally accepted among the domestic 
constituencies not as an idea (or, for that matter, as 
identity) per se, but rather as a national interest 
inherent to that state. This behavior and behavioral 
mentality is defined herein as the irrational component of 
interest. The most common form of such interest is the 
perception of prestige and respect by other members of the 
international system. It is common among the post-colonial 
metropoles and borders with the imperial nostalgia. 
However, policies and actions dictated by such a notion are 
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far from being nostalgic. The self-perceived demand for 
prestige by the post-Soviet Russia, or the Gaullist idea of 
grandeur that continues to inspire France are the most 
notable examples.  
Great powers are more prone to self-esteem and 
perception of prestige than small states; it means that the 
great powers tend to behave more irrationally than the 
small states. Russia in 1914 entered the First World War 
based on the irrational understanding of its “vital 
national interest” – defending the “brotherly” Orthodox and 
Slavic state of Serbia. Paradoxically, the same 
irrationality over the same issue has nearly driven modern 
Russia into another conflict with its Western “friends” in 
1999, when the NATO led a campaign against the-then regime 
in Belgrade over the human rights issue in Kosovo. The 
United States might have more interest in the events in 
Liberia, the history of which is linked with that of 
America, whereas any event of the same size and 
significance happening in any other African country of the 
same size and “relevance” may deserve much less attention 
from Washington. Do these two examples point us to any 
interest-driven agenda of a major power, or reveal to us an 
irrational perception of interest, interlinked with 
identity and appealing to a larger constituency at home? 
  There is a solid argument that the pursuit of 
prestige is a rational act, as Morgenthau describes: 
 
[P]restige, in contrast to the maintenance 
and acquisition of power, is but rarely an 
end in itself. More frequently, the policy 
of prestige is one of the instrumentalities 
through which the policies of the status quo 
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I, however, associate rationality with the actual 
capacity to achieve a particular goal associated with 
prestige, and vice versa. Thus, any pursuit of prestige, 
when matched by the state’s capacity, can be regarded 
merely as an extension of the security and economic 
interest, and whenever the capacity falls short of 
ambitions, it has to be defined as irrationality. In either 
context I do not disregard the irrational pursuit of 
interest as a negligible factor in foreign policy, 
primarily because of Morgenthau’s own recognition of it: 
 
The policy of prestige, however exaggerated 
and absurd its uses may have been at times, 
is as intrinsic an element of the relations 
between nations as the desire for prestige 
is of the relations between individuals. 
Here again it becomes obvious that 
international and domestic politics are but 
different manifestations of one and the same 
social fact.43 
 
Irrationality persists in the policies of not only 
the great powers, but of the small states too, though 
mainly in its moderate form. In its extreme form it has 
produced the “rogue ideologies” of the past century, still 
relevant in the present – ideas and perception of interest 
based on ethnic and racial superiority, class struggle or 
religious exclusiveness. In sum, the less the irrationality 
persists in the foreign policy, the more stable the 
                     42 Morgenthau (1948/1973), p. 73. 
43 Morgenthau (1948/1973), p. 74. 
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environment in which a particular state is situated, and 
vice versa. Ironically, in a totalitarian society, the 
irrational perception of interest can be disregarded by the 
decision-makers. On the contrary, in a democracy, the 
elected officials and institutions face a challenge to be 
accountable and be responsive to their domestic 
constituencies, which, in turn, are bearers of the 
irrational perceptions of the national interest. Therefore 
it is extremely important to identify the conflicting and 
complementing areas of the above-mentioned three components 
of interest.    
d.  Competing and Complementing Interests 
Interests of a state may overlap and contradict 
each other. No policy or agenda guarantees the harmony 
between the rational and irrational interpretations of 
interest, or between security, economy and self-esteem. A 
situation in which a particular state has conflicting 
interests is easy to imagine; its primary economic 
benefactor at the same time might be a dominant security 
threat, and its security provider may be a military power 
but has little to offer to that state’s economic well-
being. In addition, both security and economic interests 
may conflict with the irrational perception of the state’s 
role and image; such a situation is plausible if our 
hypothetic state has shared interests with the third power, 
or any constituencies within its security provider and/or 
economic benefactor. Russia’s arms sales to the regimes 
labeled by the United States as “rogue,” and as members of 
the “axis of evil” is an example of such a conflict and its 
temporary solution by the current Russian leadership. It is 
in essence a conflict between short-term economic benefit, 
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coupled with the self-perceived role as a regional power on 
the one hand, and the long-term national interest of 
elaborating its confidence and cooperation with the West, 
on the other.  
  The rational and irrational components of 
interest not only conflict with one another, but also 
complement each other. There could be situations where a 
state that pursues the policy driven by an irrational 
stance eventually accumulates what it has been rationally 
longing for – economic incentives and security guarantee. 
An example of such a situation is North Korea, which has 
been acting on the basis of the irrational doctrine, while 
being engaged in a relentless politics of nuclear 
brinkmanship. Nevertheless, to some degree it facilitated 
the appeasement and the subsequent economic and security 
assurances from both its adversaries (the United States, 
Japan and South Korea) and former allies (Russia and 
China). This depiction of North Korea’s situation can be 
argued, because the very assurance of its economic and 
security well-being is highly limited. In addition, such 
policy could not bring about a long-term or permanent 
satisfaction of its vital interests and could lead to more 
tragic consequences. Nonetheless, in the meantime 
P’yŏngyang seems to be driven by a combination of both 
rational and irrational components of interest.  
  Thus, a question arises whether in a broader 
meaning of our approach, identity and interest conflict and 
whether those can be effectively reconciled. The next 




D.  RECONCILIATION OF IDENTITY AND INTEREST 
1. Dilemma Between Pragmatism and Idealism 
 From the typology of identity and interest as the two 
main causal factors of foreign policy, there stems a 
necessary question: What combination of identity types and 
interest components assist in forming a solid and sound 
foreign policy and which ones do not? The answer was 
partially answered when the particular factors were 
addressed in the previous sections, but an integrated 
statement must be made in order to provide this chapter 
with its own thesis. In terms of identity, states with 
convergent identity tend to have stable policy 
orientations. With regard to interest, the absence or lower 
level of irrationality leads to, in Morgenthau’s words, a 
“good” foreign policy. Hence, the overall judgment is that 
a state with convergent identity and rational interest 
should be viewed as a stable regime in terms of 
international relations. Nevertheless, these types of 
identity and interest do not automatically overlap; a very 
convergent identity could conflict with a very rational 
interest. Hence appears the phenomenon of the conflict of 
the two major schools of international relations – realism 
and constructivism.   
 A state’s perception of its role vis-a-vis external 
actors and the ideas chosen by domestic constituencies 
compose what theorists describe as “identity.” Identity 
reflects the interest of a state but is also a social 
construction; and therefore, interest, too, can be 
perceived differently depending on how identity is 
constructed. Max Weber observed that: 
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Interests (material and ideal), not ideas, 
dominate directly the actions of men. Yet 
the “images of the world” created by these 
ideas have very often served as switches 
determining the tracks on which the dynamism 
of interests kept actions moving.44 
 
 Therefore, though I agree with the importance of 
interest as the cause of behavior, I ascribe the perception 
of interest to the construction of identity. Thus, the 
causal chain is that identity in its various forms is 
constructed by a society, which defines a state’s interest, 
and in the conflict and/or reconciliation of the two exist 
the criteria for a state’s success in foreign policy. In 
sum, neither identity nor interest is static and both are 
subject to choices and interpretations. The two can 
correlate in various matters, and the common ground can be 
found in the neo-liberal approach stressing cooperation 
among rational actors. 
a. Conflict of Realist and Constructivist  
 Approaches 
  In a hypothetical situation, state A must declare 
war against state B based on its rational calculations of 
safeguarding the national security. The following is the 
ambiguity of this situation. State B is of the same 
geographical, civilizational and political identity as 
state A, while state C, belonging to a different, rival 
identity group, fulfills its objective of breaking the 
unity among the group encompassing both A and B. In this 
context, state A might even enlist the help of state C 
against state B, and while solving its immediate concern of 
                     44 Max Weber (1920): Gesammelte Ausfätze zur Religionsoziology. 
Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr, p. 252; this citation is quoted in Morgenthau 
(1948/1973), p. 9.  
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interest, enters a phase of detachment from its core area 
of identity. An example would be the Sino-Soviet split, a 
process that undermined the politically constructed 
identity for the sake of the interest of domination over 
the world’s Communist movement (this interest could be 
defined as both rational and irrational), and thus 
facilitated the Western powers (principally, the United 
States) to exploit the divergence within the bloc.  
  The reverse situation is also plausible, where 
state A decides to reach a peace settlement with the state 
B belonging to a different identity group, against which it 
had fought a war. In doing this, state A antagonizes the 
multitude of states with which it shares common identity 
and all of which perceive state B as the prime threat to 
their security. As a consequence, state A becomes the 
“rogue” within its own realm of identity. This is 
strikingly similar to the depiction of Egypt’s situation 
following its peace negotiations with Israel.  
  From a realist point of view, once a security 
threat is removed, or an economic advantage is gained, the 
identity affiliation is secondary and therefore could and 
should be sacrificed. However, from a constructivist point 
of view, there is a different angle to look at. Identity, 
as a set of ideas, is not an important value per se, as 
opposed to security and economy, but is a long-term 
stabilizing factor that facilitates the safeguarding of the 
security and economic interests. Preservation of identity 
at the expense of interest might lose some dividends, but 
can earn political and security investments. These two 
viewpoints clash seemingly without any crossing point. 
Nevertheless, the third approach to the international 
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system bears some of the reconciling capacity that realism 
and constructivism do not possess. 
b.  Neo-liberal Approach to Regional Order   
     It is not the objective of this section to 
provide an overall evaluation of liberalism, but to define 
the areas in which the liberal and neo-liberal schools 
offer a middle-ground position on the contradictions 
between constructivism and realism, e.g. in the conflict 
between identity and interest. Classical liberalism 
deriving from the Kantian proposition of “perpetual 
peace,”45 seemingly presents a sharp contrast to the 
Hobbesian46 notion of a self-help system of international 
relations and implicit idealism of constructivists. But the 
neo-liberal camp offers an approach that does not deny the 
significance of the rationality and interest-based 
policymaking or the acknowledgement of the role ideas play 
in shaping the policy outcomes. Perhaps, in defining the 
nature of bilateral and multilateral cooperation between 
any two states we can apply the abstract formulation, 
labeled “the Prisoner’s Dilemma”, according to which “the 
pursuit of self-interest by each player leads to poor 
outcome for all.”47  
                     45 For further reference on Immanuel Kant’s ideas on “utility for 
perpetual peace,” see Carl Joachim Friedrich (1948): Inevitable Peace. 
Harvard University Press, pp. 189-209. 
46 For further references on Hobbesian ideas on the world order, see 
Thomas Hobbes (1650): The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic: Human 
Nature and De Corpore Politico, edited with an introduction by J. C. A. 
Gaskin (1994), Oxford University Press; and Thomas Hobbes (1651): 
Leviathan, or the Matter, Forme and Power of A Commonwealth, 
Ecclesiastical and Civil, edited with an introduction by Michael 
Oakeshott (1960). Basil Blackwell.  
47 Robert Axelrod (1984): The Evolution of Cooperation. Best Books, 
p. 24.   
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  In such a situation, neo-liberals claim, the 
possibility of cooperation based on reciprocity exists. 
However, this possibility is likely to be stronger within a 
regional framework rather than outside it. Rational actors 
do not seek confrontation with their more powerful 
opponents. Under certain conditions “cooperation can emerge 
in a world of egoists without central authority.”48 In 
other words, “a state will attempt [to change] the 
international system … only if the expected benefits exceed 
the expected costs.”49   
  Development of free markets and business culture 
throughout the world requires increased say of the business 
communities, which prioritize economic interests over any 
other incentives. Common economic interests lead the states 
in the region to search for a collective mechanism to 
safeguard their interest, thus paving a way for security 
cooperation. In a way, this attitude of economic pragmatism 
and realism, based on “win-win” approach, shall eventually 
create a cooperative environment that resembles political 
idealism. Therefore, as for the long-term perspectives, 
“with an indefinite number of interactions, [genuine] 
cooperation can emerge.”50  
  As a result, the crystallization of the regional 
identity undergoes a more rapid process within the 
framework of interest-driven cooperation, rather than the 
zero-sum approach. It is this neo-liberal viewpoint that 
can be exploited as a tool of consolidating the emerging 
                     48 Axelrod (1984), p. 3. 
49 Robert Gilpin (1981): War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge, 
p. 10. 
50 Axelrod (1984), p. 6.    
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regional identities and reconciling the identity and 
interest of particular states. In other words, economic 
interest can lead to cooperation, and successful 
cooperation can lead to a collective regional identity, 
which in turn makes conflict less likely. 
 2. Identity and Interest of A Small State  
 One more component is critical in studying or 
prescribing Mongolia’s foreign policy. Mongolia is a small 
state, and the research on its identity and interest must 
address the specific features of small states. First, in 
order to avoid any misunderstanding further in this 
research piece, the term “small state” must be defined.51  
 a.  What is a Small State? 
  Among the political entities with statehood 
status, there are a number of them that could qualify as 
“small states” without any debate: both geographically and 
demographically. These are the mini-states of Europe, the 
Persian Gulf and Oceania. Others may qualify exclusively by 
their small area size or small population. There are many 
anomalies attached to various classifications. For 
instance, is Mongolia, equaling to one-fifth of the 
continental U.S. a small state, or is Bangladesh with its 
100 million citizens? One possible criterion is low 
population density, but those, such as Canada and 
Australia, are certainly not to be regarded as “small.” 
Other categories, such as GDP or GDP per capita, are simply 
disregarded, since there are a number of unquestionably 
small states with high level of economic achievement and 
living standards, such as Singapore or Kuwait. Perhaps the 
                     
 51 For further information on small states see Michael Handel (1981): 
Weak States in the International System. F. Cass Publishers. 
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overarching definition would be the combination and/or 
correlation of all the above-mentioned criteria, with 
addition of the state’s international position and 
influence. However, for this research, the population is 
exclusively regarded as the key criteria of a small state 
and other calculations are disregarded. 
b. Identity of Small States 
  The identity of small states derives from their 
place within the respective civilizations. Most of the 
small states are ethnically homogeneous, and hence the 
identity affiliation does not usually create a great sense 
of ambiguity among the domestic constituencies. Therefore, 
small states as the product of ethnic consolidation of the 
small population do not constitute the distinct cultural 
realm. The only exception could be Israel, which, 
discounting large diaspora communities, solely represents 
the Jewish identity and cultural orbit. Hence the 
uniqueness of the small states – their identity reflects a 
marginal or integral part of a broader identity grouping, 
regardless of its typology. In the civilizational context, 
small states do not represent a civilization, but 
constitute its part. The same argument could be made about 
the small states’ political and/or geographic identity.  
  The distinction between integral and marginal 
parts of an identity group – in all three categories of it 
– is not brought here by accident. Even nations descending 
from the founders of the civilizations, if they constitute 
a small state in the modern times, cannot play a role of 
the core of their respective civilizations. Modern Greece 
should be regarded as the center or the dominant entity 
within the Eastern Orthodox realm; however, due to its 
43 
size, Russia is more likely to acquire that recognition. 
The same argument can be used about the group of nations 
collectively referred to as the “Anglo-Saxon world”: it is 
the United States and not the United Kingdom that 
represents the reflection of this identity. In broader 
terms, the United States has become the quintessential 
member of the Western civilization, despite the Greco-Roman 
and Judaic roots of the latter.  
  The above-mentioned examples show how the 
identity of small states is reduced to that of an integral, 
but ordinary part of a broader identity realm. There is 
another dimension to the identity evolution of small 
states. If great powers acquire divergent identity, they 
tend to obtain the characteristics of the “torn” nations, 
unless when possessing overwhelming power and the capacity 
to project it in all directions. On the contrary, small 
states when faced with divergence of identity tend to be 
marginalized from the greater identity realms. One might 
think of Christian/Muslim Albania, which is not fully 
accepted by either of the two civilizations as their 
integral part. Another cause of marginalization is 
geographical distance from the core area of its identity. 
This is a form of divergent identity, conflicting along the 
primordiality-crystallization lines. Ethiopia, Armenia and 
Georgia represent the earliest but geographically distant 
outposts of the Christian civilization, located within the 
boundaries of the Islamic world, but none of these nations 
are recognized as “Western.” All these analogies will be 




  c.  Interest of Small States 
  Small states reflect their specific features when 
defining their national interest. From the three components 
of interest, irrationality, though present, plays the least 
role in policymaking. Irrational perception of interest 
therefore is confined to the civil society rather than in 
the bureaucracy and/or elected offices. For most small 
states, survival, e.g. the security interest is the key 
concern for all constituencies. Hence, small states mostly 
tend to follow Morgenthau’s definition of a “good foreign 
policy” being a “rational foreign policy.”52 However, 
possessing insufficient political, military and/or economic 
power to use as leverage against its opponents, it is 
natural for small states to eschew pure realism and power-
balancing politics. Instead, small states see their 
economic interests as both a top priority and as a 
necessary intermediary for safeguarding their security 
interests. Especially if the criterion for labeling a 
country “small” is the population size (which is used 
herein), the physical survival of a small state directly 
connotes the demographical survival and social development, 
which is the amalgam of national, societal and individual 
interests.53  
d.  Advantages and Disadvantages 
  Thus, if in identity small states face more 
challenges of marginalization than great powers, in the 
context of interest they are confronted with greater 
vulnerability, but at the same time enjoy more space to 
                     52 Morgenthau (1948/1973), p. 8.   
53 The terms used in the cited book are “state, social and civilian 
interests,” which are identical to the terms “national, societal and 
individual” used herein; see Bold (2000), p. 36. 
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reconcile the interests of their domestic constituencies 
into a common agenda. The United Nations General Assembly 
recognized that:  
 
Small states may be particularly vulnerable 
to external threats and acts of interference 
in their internal affairs and may have 
special needs consonant with the right to 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.54  
 
  Hence the disadvantages of small states in the 
international arena: risk of identity marginalization 
leading to international isolation, greater vulnerability 
and insufficient power and capacity to ensure security. The 
advantages are: relative ethnic homogeneity, causing the 
convergence of identity into a strong national and regional 
ones, lack or low profile of irrationality in the pursuit 
of interest, greater reconciliation of the national, 
societal and individual interests, thus contributing to the 
domestic and regional stability. Therefore, the ultimate 
policy of any small state is the exploitation of the latter 
while eschewing the former. The next chapter will address 
these particular issues with regard to Mongolia.  
E. CHAPTER FINDINGS 
The following are generalizations of the theoretical 
findings that are intended to guide the rest of the thesis: 
- Though state is a single, rational actor, it 
consists of a society, e.g. a sum of individuals 
that convey different views on policy;  
                     54 United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/49/31, 9 December 
1994. Paragraph 4. 
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- Identity and interest are equally important 
factors in foreign policy;  
- Identity causes the construction of what is 
perceived to be interest; on the other hand, 
interest, too, can serve as the pathway of 
shaping identity; 
- The two seem to be in an inherent conflict, but 
those are reconcilable, especially via the means 
of a liberal approach to regional identity and 
cooperative pursuit of interest; 
- Identity has three types; of these, the 
primordial plays the least role in foreign policy 
due to its archaic nature, and the civilizational 
and political identities tend to be the stronger 
forms of construction; 
- The three types of identity can diverge or 
converge; the states with divergent identity face 
the dilemma or trilemma, thus complicating 
interest formulation and policy choices; 
- Interest can be rational (pursuit of security and 
economic benefits) or irrational (pursuit of 
prestige without obtaining sufficient capacity); 
the latter, too, complicates the policy options; 
- Small states are particularly vulnerable not only 
to the external threat, but also to the 
possibility of being marginalized from the core 
areas of civilizational or geo-political 
identity, and thus, from the global affairs at 
large.  
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- Therefore, the optimal, rational choice for a 
small state is to minimize the identity 
divergence and interest irrationality and to 
maximize cooperation within the regional 




























































III. MONGOLIA’S FOREIGN POLICY AS DEFINED 
BY IDENTITY AND INTEREST 
 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The previous chapter described the roles of identity 
and interest in foreign policy with particular emphasis on 
the implications for small states. This chapter addresses 
Mongolia’s current geopolitical situation within the 
context of the theoretical framework laid out in the 
previous chapter. First, Mongolia’s identity formation will 
be briefly analyzed; the chapter will name the three types 
of identity that were constructed throughout its long 
history. The chapter will cover the divergence of identity 
and the subsequent identity trilemma that Mongolia faces.  
Second, Mongolia’s national interest will be assessed 
from the viewpoint of the two inherent paradigms present in 
modern Mongolia’s foreign policy and security: the “two-
neighbors” vs. the “third neighbor” paradigm. An evaluation 
of each paradigm’s benefit and risk factors within the 
context of identity construction is offered. Further, I 
shall propose three parameters of the correlation of 
identity and interest based on the premises of the small 
states’ relative weakness. In this chapter I advocate a 
stronger pursuit of regional identity, especially the East 
Asian one, and for that purpose I introduce a 
“construction-deconstruction” dichotomy in identity 





B. IDENTITY AS A FACTOR IN MONGOLIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 
1. Three Perceptions of Identity as                   
Historical Legacy  
The previous chapter provided the identity typology as 
a framework to address the impact of identity on policy-
making. The same pattern is used in this chapter to 
distinguish the existing trends of identity perception in 
contemporary Mongolia and their causal influence on foreign 
policy. As a result of historical processes leading up to 
the 21st century, Mongolia has acquired a triple form of 
identity, representing the three types classified in the 
previous chapter.      
a. Central Asian Mongolia: Quest for 
   Traditionalism 
  Modern Mongolia is a relatively monoethnic 
nation-state. The majority (95 per cent, est.) of the 
population is composed of ethnic Mongols, considered to be 
autochthonous ethnie of the East Central Asian plateau. 
Linguistically, the Mongolian language belongs to the 
Altaic family and shares distant links to the Turkic, 
Tungusic, and possibly Korean and Japanese languages.55 With 
regards to the socioeconomic traditions, nomadic herdsmen, 
as opposed to the sedentary farmers of East Asia proper, 
historically inhabited the elevated grasslands of Central 
Asia. Therefore, the Mongolian primordial identity (by 
virtue of geography, ethno-linguistic affiliation and 
lifestyle) is that of the Central Asian realm, sharing many 
commonalities with the kindred peoples to the west – the 
Turkic-speaking Central Asian nomads. Central Asian 
                     55 John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer and Albert M. Craig (1989): 
East Asia: Tradition and Transformation, Revised Edition. Houghton 
Mifflin, pp. 145-163.   
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identity serves the primordial role for Mongolia and 
distances it from the Sinitic-Confucian East Asian 
civilization. However, the primordial identity (in general) 
precedes the formation of not only the modern nation-state, 
but also the formation of any forms of statehood, and 
therefore, cannot play a decisive causal role in the 
political process. The primordiality of the Mongols is 
rooted in the times long before the imperial age and 
commonality with other Central Asians in lifestyle, customs 
and basic utilitarian substances, such as traditional 
housing and diet, has been maintained. However, their 
mutual cultural unity was disconnected during the late 
medieval period, largely because of the nearly simultaneous 
conversion of the Mongolian- and Turkic-speaking peoples to 
the two different world religions, Buddhism and Islam 
respectively.  
  In contemporary Mongolian political thought, 
Central Asian identity is acquiring the role of a political 
idea, representing cultural conservatism, ethnocentrism and 
traditionalism in the domestic agenda and the continental 
orientation in foreign policy, though its influence is 
minimal. Central Asian heritage undoubtedly has many unique 
features distinct from both East Asian and Islamic 
civilizations; and although the reference to the “Mongolian 
civilization” is common in the contemporary Mongolian 
academic and political lexicon and is reflected in the 
National Security Concept,56 the renowned scholars of 
civilization do not place a specific Central Asian realm 
                     56 Jamsran Bayasakh (2001): “Mongol Ulsyn Guravdagch Khörsh Khiigeed 
Tünshiin Asuudald,” (Mon., “On the Third Neighbor and Partner for 
Mongolia”) in Mongol Ulsyn Ündesnii Ayūlgüi Baidlyn Üzel Barimtlalyn 
Shinjlekh Ukhaany Ündeslel  (Mon., “Academic Rationale for the National 
Security Concept of Mongolia”). National University of Mongolia Press, 
pp. 51-52.   
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among the world’s core cultural areas. Only Arnold J. 
Toynbee recognizes the existence of the nomadic 
civilization, but he defines it as an “arrested 
civilization,” and prescribes its merger with the Islamic 
and Far Eastern areas.57 With its weak academic recognition 
and minimal impact on politics, the connotation of a 
“Central Asian Mongolia” is juxtaposed against the second 
identity, based on a broader notion of culture.  
b. East Asian Mongolia: Quest for Prosperity  
  It has been stated in the previous paragraph that 
Mongolia shares its primordial identity with the Central 
Asian nations, yet differs greatly in terms of religion and 
civilization. Search for, and definition of the Mongolian 
crystallized identity can be more difficult than of any 
other type. On the one hand, due to the sectarian 
differences within the dominant religion (Vajrayana 
Buddhism as opposed to the East Asian Mahayana and 
Southeast Asian Hinayana) and negligible presence, if not 
total lack, of Confucian tradition in the society, as well 
as the lifestyle difference, Mongolian national identity 
does not coincide with those of the other East Asian 
nations. Samuel Huntington places Mongolia not within the 
East Asian (Sinitic) civilization but within a separate 
Buddhist civilization, along with Tibet, Thailand, Myanmar, 
Laos and Cambodia.58 On the other hand, separateness of the 
above-mentioned nations from the broader East Asian 
cultural realm is more artificial than factual. In 
addition, the sectarian difference within Buddhism, if 
properly counted, does not help place all of these 
                     57 Toynbee (1946/1987), p. 574. 
58 Huntington (1996), p. 48. 
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countries within one group, let alone with the non-
independent Tibet. In reality, even the cultures with less 
influence of Confucianism as a philosophy had their share 
of Confucian values that still persist amidst tumultuous 
radicalism of the past century. Controversial though this 
statement might be, Mongolia’s social ethics share common 
principles with the Confucian ones, namely, in the intra-
societal relations and reverence for the scholars’ strata.  
  In the 13-14th centuries the Mongolian Empire 
incorporated most of the Confucian, or Sinitic cultural 
area, and hence had acquired many of the latter’s ethical 
and institutional norms. The patronage of the Vajrayana 
Buddhism, practiced by the Yuan court, is interpreted in 
two diametrically opposing ways – as a means of repudiating 
Confucian values, or as a means of stressing them along 
with the sense of Asian-ness of the imperial house against 
the influence of Islam, by then widely spread among the 
Central Asians.59 During the Qing period, both Mongolia and 
Tibet were incorporated into the East Asian universalist 
empire, and thus, the local form of Buddhism, while 
retaining its distinctness, was influenced by and gave 
influence to the Confucian civilization. Therefore, the 
regional identity of the Mongols had become inalienably 
that of East Asia at the onset of the 20th century.      
  During the Communist rule, Mongolia’s East Asian 
identity was harshly suppressed both by the Soviets and the 
local satellite regime. This situation was caused mainly by 
the Soviet geopolitical concerns, but was also supplemented 
by Mongolia’s fear of China.   
                     59 On the religious policies of the Mongolian Empire, see Fairbank, 
Reischauer and Craig (1989), pp. 168-170. 
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  The post-Communist period offered Mongolia a 
renewed position in international affairs, and the 
opportunity to reassert its once-disregarded Asian 
identity. Rapidly developing ties with Japan, South Korea 
and China, as well as emerging contacts with Southeast 
Asian states, leading to a further increase in investment, 
cultural and humanitarian exchange among these nations, 
serve as the key factors assisting this process. Henceforth 
the major argument of this thesis is that the East Asian 
identity is considered the most important factor in 
contemporary Mongolia’s foreign policy. Centered on 
economic development and prosperity, this factor provides 
guidance for the approach favoring integration with East 
Asian states and regional institutions. Despite the 
obviousness of its prevalence, the third type of identity, 
constructed during the Communist period and revitalized 
after its end, currently acts as an alternative course. For 
the lack of an overarching term, this perception can be 
labeled as “quasi-Europeanism” or “globalism” etc., and 
preferred herein is the term “cosmopolitanism.”        
c. “Cosmopolitan” Mongolia: Quest for Modernity 
The most important social construction in 
Mongolia’s modern history occurred during the period of 
rule by the Communist regime. Mongolia’s political 
leadership, as well as the large segment of society (in 
particular, the urban population which by now constitutes 
nearly two-thirds of the entire population), became 
increasingly aware of itself as a “non-Asiatic,” “almost 
European” and “progressive” society. Largely derivative of 
the Marxist version of internationalism, it resulted from 
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the Soviet policy of maintaining Mongolia within its orbit 
of influence rather than of any rival power in East Asia. 
This identity, imposed and easily adopted, clashed with the 
East Asian one, and noteworthy, did not constitute an 
agreement with the Central Asian primordiality, for the 
latter was suspected by the Soviet and Mongolian Communist 
rulers as the carrier ideology of ethic nationalism. 
Instead, a totally new identity had to be constructed on 
the premises of “proletarian internationalism.”60 
The socio-political implications of this 
construction were significant: Mongolia joined all forms of 
integration with the East European socialist countries, 
except for the Warsaw Pact, while retaining minimal 
contacts with fellow Asian socialist states. By the late 
1980s, the educated elite was comprised almost entirely of 
Soviet and Eastern European university graduates.61 
Institutional, societal and economic practices were 
thoroughly modeled after those of the USSR, so that the 
average Mongolian citizen could easily fit the 
qualifications for being labeled Homo Sovieticus. Dmitri 
Trenin stipulates this phenomenon: 
 
Mongolia [itself] has been a Russian 
protectorate since 1911. The Russian/Soviet 
political, economic and cultural influence 
in Mongolia was overwhelming. Ironically, 
the Russian-speaking Mongolian elites 
                     60 The study on this form of politicized identity is found in Tom 
Ginsburg (1999): “Nationalism, Elites and Mongolia’s Rapid 
Transformation,” in Stephen Kotkin and Bruce A. Elleman, ed. (1999): 
Mongolia in the Twentieth Century: Landlocked Cosmopolitan. M. E. 
Sharpe, Inc., pp. 248-249.  
61 Ginsburg (1999), pp. 263-267. 
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identified themselves with Eastern Europe 
rather than Asia.62   
  
 This had several impacts on Mongolia’s political, 
economic and cultural development during and after the 
Communist period, both positive and negative. The negative 
side is the detachment of the nation from its cultural 
heritage and restraints on the prospects for wider regional 
cooperation. These factors have become the prime target for 
most Western scholars studying Mongolia’s political 
transformation. According to Alan Sanders: 
 
For ideological and political reasons, 
Mongolia cut itself off unnecessarily from 
financial and economic aid offered it on 
favorable terms by developed countries, 
[and] … [Mongolia’s] actions on the world 
scene as a player of the international 
system had not always been in the country’s 
own interests.63 
 
Furthermore, Steven Fish identifies the Soviet 
influence as responsible for many challenges that Mongolia 
had to face in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of 
the Communist bloc: 
 
Because the duration and extent of 
Sovietization was greater in there than in 
any other country in the Soviet bloc outside                      62 By “Russian-speaking elites” Trenin probably means the people with 
fluent knowledge of Russian and not people who speak Russian as a 
native tongue, as this term is used most of the time; see Dmitri Trenin 
(2001): The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics 
and Globalization. Carnegie Moscow Center, p. 291.   
63 Alan J. K. Sanders (1996): “Foreign Relations and Foreign Policy,” 
in Ole Bruun and Ole Odgaard (ed.): Mongolia in Transition: Old 
Patterns, New Challenges. Curzon Press, p. 219. 
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the USSR itself, Mongolia experienced the 
full brunt of Stalinist terror than no other 
nation in the bloc had. In spite of the 
Soviet support that maintained the nation’s 
economy viable throughout the decades, by 
1990 Mongolia embarked on its transition 
with the lowest standard of living in the 
Communist world [matched only by Albania.] … 
The termination of total dependence on the 
Soviet Union sparked a degree of economic 
trauma unusual even by post-Communist 
standards.64 
 
On the apologetic side of the cosmopolitan 
identity, several positive developments can be mentioned. 
While Mongolian statehood counts at least some eight 
centuries or even more of tradition, as a nation-state (in 
Westphalian terms) modern Mongolia has a relatively short 
history.65 Soviet influence, cemented by the Communist 
government in Mongolia, created a viable, civic national 
identity, the legacy of which remains a vital prerequisite 
in Mongolia’s successful quest for democracy. Close ties 
with the most liberal-minded Communist nations, such as 
Poland, (the former) Czechoslovakia and Hungary may have 
been part of the Soviet strategy of driving Mongolia apart 
from its cultural heritage; but nonetheless the impact 
benefited Mongolia when it became the only Asian Communist 
nation to go through a peaceful revolution toward 
democracy. A decade after the fall of the socialist system, 
Mongolia boasts its place among the high-ranking performers 
in political and civil liberties among the post-Communist 
                     64 M.Steven Fish (1999): “Mongolia: Democracy Without Prerequisites,” 
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nations.66 Hence, it can be said that the integration with 
East European nations – while being guarded from feasible 
contacts with the most notorious Asian Communist regimes, 
like North Korea - is the most valuable legacy of the 
Soviet domination.   
Following the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the 
Mongolian elite and society no longer identify themselves 
in terms of this quasi-“Eastern European-ness,” but the 
same mentality remains persistent in a renewed 
cosmopolitanism – this time, reflected in the liberal 
internationalism. Proponents of this identity stress the 
nationwide acceptance of the Western-style democratic 
practices and the Anglo-Saxon model of free market economy 
as a result of the “uniqueness” of Mongolian identity and 
its difference from the East Asian paternalistic cultural 
traditions.67 This phenomenon has been equated to 
modernization and portrayed as a precondition for 
successful integration into the global political and 
economic trends. For the purpose of democratic 
consolidation in domestic politics and successful 
transition into the market economy, this perception indeed 
serves as a viable pathway; however, as a factor in foreign 
policy, it creates ambiguity, which further is defined as 
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2.  The “Identity Trilemma” 
By virtue of its unique geographic location, 
historical developments and numerous external influences 
Mongolia emerges as a nation with divergent identities at 
the threshold of the 21st century. Its Central Asian 
primordiality, East Asian cultural crystallization and 
cosmopolitan socio-political construction continue to shape 
the nation’s political thought and foreign policy 
orientation. 
Romantic nationalism, based on the Central Asian 
identity, cannot realistically offer a substantial foreign 
policy agenda and even a solid domestic policy platform 
other than the preservation of the indigenous lifestyle 
and/or gradual development of pastoralism - what David 
Sneath identifies as “Mongolia’s socio-ethnical system.”68 
Despite its minor impact on political thought, this type of 
identity continues to serve in two capacities – as an 
intellectual pathway for the Mongolian version of 
“isolationalism,” or as a framework for coping with 
Russian, Western and possibly Turkish interests in post-
Soviet Central Asia. 
On the contrary, the legacy of the constructed 
cosmopolitan identity was the most far-reaching for the 
reasons described in the previous section. In answering the 
question whether continued assertion of “cosmopolitanism” 
serves well the other national goals – security assurance 
and economic development via integration into the global 
economy, the argument has usually been in the favor of this 
                     68 David Sneath (1997): “Mobility, Technology, and Decollectivization 
of Pastoralism in Mongolia,” in Stephen Kotkin and Bruce A. Elleman, 
ed. (1999): Mongolia in the Twentieth Century: Landlocked Cosmopolitan. 
M. E. Sharpe, Inc., p. 232. 
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approach. It is generally accepted in the Mongolian 
political and academic community that the preservation of 
the “balanced” relations with both neighbors and the quest 
for partnerships across the globe is a rational, sound 
foreign policy agenda.69 This viewpoint is stated in the 
founding document of Mongolian foreign policy.70  
The argument I make in this research is that the East 
Asian approach to identity can serve the two above-
mentioned goals with no less success than the cosmopolitan 
one. As a matter of fact, despite the rhetorical 
declaration of “balanced” relations, East Asian nations 
dominate in Mongolia’s post-Cold War trade and economic 
relations, and the country is increasingly becoming 
acquainted with the existing regional mechanisms for common 
security and cooperation. Appeals to the Asia-Pacific, or 
Northeast Asian regional identification have been made; 
however, the divergence of identity is causing certain 
ambiguity in the acceptance of this fact. 
Thus, Mongolia is an example of a country with 
divergent identity, all three types of which provide a 
different causal pathway in formulating the nation’s 
policy. However, as ideas by themselves cannot define the 
foreign policy without reference to national interest, 
identification of Mongolia’s foreign policy orientation 
will be incomplete without analyzing its second causal 
factor – the interest.   
      
                     69 For further elaboration on this concept, see Guudain Tumurchuluun 
(1999): “Mongolia’s Foreign Policy Revisited: Relations with Russia and 
the PRC into the 1990s,” in Stephen Kotkin and Bruce A. Elleman, ed. 
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E. Sharpe, Inc., pp. 277-289. 
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C.  INTEREST AS A FACTOR IN MONGOLIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 
1.  Historical Patterns and Contemporary Pathways 
The national interest of Mongolia is largely 
derivative of its peculiar status as a landlocked small 
state, geographically situated between two major powers, 
and as a nation with divergent identity. Mongolia’s 
interest is therefore defined in terms of the amalgam of 
national, societal and individual interests and covers a 
wide spectrum of definition – from physical survival (as 
with any small state, this connotation primarily means the 
demographic survival) and preservation of its culture to 
acceleration of its economic development (the latter is 
understood in terms of both a goal by itself and a 
necessary guarantee for securing its international status).      
a. The Russo-Chinese Tangle:  
“The Two-Neighbors” Paradigm 
Historically, the struggle for survival has been 
conducted by means of balancing the powers in the immediate 
adjacent regions. Throughout the past century the “two 
neighbors” policy, stressing balancing Russia and China off 
against one another in order to preserve its independence 
and demographic composition, has prevailed. The importance 
of state survival, based on the persistent official, semi-
official and unofficial claims by China on Mongolian 
sovereignty and the lack of the latter’s sufficient 
defensive capabilities was the major causal factor behind 
this policy. In addition, the balancing approach was also 
caused by the idea of demographic survival, e.g. the 
preservation of the Mongolian ethnocentric nationhood and 
its protection from assimilation by the numerically 
predominant Han Chinese, which had been the key factor in 
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Mongolia’s security thinking and has contributed to the 
construction of Sinophobic attitudes, and therefore, 
exerted influence over the emergence of the identity 
divergence discussed in the previous section.     
Russia’s interest in Mongolia vis-à-vis China 
began in the mid-19th century with the Governor-General 
Muraviëv’s report, where he stated the future strategic 
importance of this region to Russia.71  
Decades after, taking advantage of China’s 
turmoil and with Russian backing, Mongolia declared its 
independence from the Qing Empire in 1911. The new Chinese 
government refused to recognize Mongolia’s independence but 
was too preoccupied with internal discord to enforce its 
sovereignty.72 As a result of the Tripartite Russo-Sino-
Mongolian Treaty concluded in 1915, the international 
status of the self-declared monarchy was reduced to that of 
an autonomous state under Chinese suzerainty. Russia, 
however, retained its support and maintained its political 
and economic influence. Occupied with revolution and 
restrained by ideological innovation, the Bolshevik 
government that took power in Russia in 1917 was unable to 
continue implementing the Asian geopolitics of its 
predecessor, the Russian Empire. Meanwhile, China demanded 
from Mongolia to surrender its autonomy, when the country 
had expected little, if any, help from outside.73 While 
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Mongolian rulers were in a panic stage, a Chinese warlord 
seized the moment and executed a military invasion of 
Mongolia in 1919, followed by the surrender of Mongolian 
autonomy to the direct rule by China.74 In October 1920, 
Russian counter-revolutionary troops invaded from Siberia. 
Three months later, after a fierce battle, they drove the 
Chinese out of the capital and occupied it.75  
These events greatly stimulated Mongolian 
nationalism. The Soviets’ desire to actively support the 
leftist nationalists and transform them into Marxists was 
dictated by the geopolitical priorities of the Russian 
state, formulated in Vladimir Lenin’s 1916 thesis: 
 
We Great Russian workers must demand that 
our governments should get out of Mongolia, 
Turkestan, and Persia. But does that mean 
that we proletarians want to be separated 
from the Mongolian, or Turkestanian, or 
Indian worker or peasant? Nothing of the 
kind. We shall exert every effort to become 
friendly and to amalgamate with the 
Mongolians …, i.e. we shall help them on 
towards democracy and socialism.76    
 
As the Bolshevik power consolidated in Siberia, 
Moscow responded to the appeals of the Mongolian 
nationalists. On July 11, 1921 the People's Government of 
Mongolia was declared, while the state continued to be 
nominally headed by the monarch. In November 1921, a 
bilateral agreement recognizing the Government of Mongolia 
and facilitating the exchange of diplomatic representatives 
                     74 Murphy (1966), p. 5. 
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was signed. Beginning in 1924, when the monarchy was 
abolished and as right-wing elements were eliminated from 
the government, the domestic politics in Mongolia turned 
further to the left. This shift had deep roots in the 
international scene, namely in the Sino-Soviet relations.  
From the Soviet perspective, when Chiang Kai-shek 
and his Nationalist Party (KMT), had broken with the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and consolidated its rule 
over eastern China in 1927, Mongolia’s leftist turn was 
necessary to Soviet control over the Asian buffer zone. By 
1945, concerned about Chiang Kai-shek’s strong pro-American 
position and motivated by the interest of weakening China 
and maintaining the political buffer, provided by a now 
loyal satellite, Joseph Stalin convinced the Allied leaders 
that China must concede its claims on Mongolia.77 The 
Nationalist government of China reluctantly accepted 
Mongolian independence and agreed to exchange diplomatic 
representatives. However, in 1949 Mongolia first broke this 
agreement by recognizing the new People's Republic of 
China. Hence, Mongolia emerged out of the post-war world 
order as a legitimate nation-state, as a result of the 
Soviet strategy of creating feasible client states 
alongside its borders.78  As Mongolia seized the opportunity 
to extend formal recognition and diplomatic relations to 
the new regime in China, the same act was reciprocated by 
the Communist Chinese side. But there was another aspect in 
Chinese recognition of Mongolia - Beijing was forced by 
Moscow to accept this term in order to sign a security 
                     77 Michael Yahuda (1997): The International Politics of the Asia and 
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treaty against the United States.79 Thus, the Sino-Soviet 
alliance facilitated the deterioration of the overall 
strategic importance of Mongolia in the USSR’s policy.80 As 
the Soviets secured their eastern frontier with the world’s 
most populous Communist regime, Mongolia had to play its 
own politics vis-à-vis the neighbors. Mongolia’s leaders 
had to become “more cautious about the aspirations of 
China” – in policy terms it meant that the dependence on 
the USSR was still a necessary tool for survival.81  
During the Sino-Soviet split, the initial 
Mongolian support for the Soviet criticism of Maoism was 
not as stalwart as that of the East European satellites.82 
According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, this position most 
probably reflected Ulaanbaatar’s concern about any form of 
retaliation from Beijing.83 By the beginning of June 1960 
the USSR withdrew support from China84 and invested into the 
Mongolian economy and provided assistance in the country’s 
industrialization and urbanization efforts.85 In 1966 the 
renewed bilateral treaty including a defense clause was 
signed.86 In accordance with its provisions, Soviet troops 
entered and Mongolia, more than ever, had become a front 
line of Soviet defense against China. In addition to basing 
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its military presence, Mongolia offered the USSR a 
potentially useful political instrument in pressuring the 
PRC – as a viable nation-state, it could compete for the 
ethnic loyalties of the Mongol population in China’s Inner 
Mongolia.87 Mongolian loyalty was also exploited in 
expanding the Soviet influence among other Asian states 
with Communist or pro-Soviet regimes and preventing them 
from entering into the Chinese orbit of Communism.  
By the early 1980s changes occurred in the Sino-
Soviet relations. Limited exchange was allowed and talks at 
the ministerial level began in 1981-82.88 First signs of 
normalization between Mongolia and China also began to 
occur during this period, but were largely subordinated to 
the Soviet directives.89 In 1986 Mikhail Gorbachëv spoke 
about the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolia and 
Afghanistan as part of the rapprochement strategy vis-à-vis 
China and the United States.90 Meanwhile, the Communist 
leaders of Mongolia - by now its reformist wing that took 
the power in 1984 - were increasingly concerned about these 
new geopolitical arrangements and began taking its own 
advantages in the situation. Ultimately, events in Eastern 
Europe in 1989-1990 echoed in Mongolia by resulting in the 
only “velvet revolution” in Asia up to these days. This 
brought about radical shift in Mongolia’s relations with 
the still-existing Soviet Union and its successor, the 
Russian Federation, as well as with China.  
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The period from 1990 through the present is 
marked by rapprochement between Russia and China, evolving 
into a strategic partnership. Despite the new Russo-
Mongolian treaty of 1993 that declared a completely new 
type of bilateral relations on an equal, “mutually 
beneficial” basis,91 the actual economic and political ties 
remained stagnant, which was primarily caused by the severe 
economic challenges faced by both countries. A similar 
treaty with the same spirit was signed in the following 
year with China, on the background of increasing trade 
volume and economic cooperation. From 1996 Russo-Chinese 
bilateral relations accelerated and a full-fledged 
strategic partnership was forged.92 Now bound by a 
partnership with China, Russia’s consideration of Mongolia 
as a country of strategic significance diminished rapidly.   
Still, the stage of Sino-Russian strategic 
partnership is far from being idyllic. Observers see it as 
a “marriage of convenience” rather than a long-term 
commitment. Russian analysts and political leaders are also 
aware of the implications should China adopt a more 
assertive stance in the future.93 Dmitri Trenin argues that 
over the next 10-15 years “the relative weakness of Russia 
and strength of China will become clearer.”94 However, it 
should not be forgotten that as an alternative to full-
fledged bilateralism, Russia and China began to launch a 
more multilateral approach in power balancing in Northeast 
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Asia. In Trenin’s view, “as China becomes the pre-eminent 
power in the region, Ulaanbaatar will have to navigate 
carefully between Moscow and the much closer Beijing.”95 
This “careful navigation” does not necessarily mean the 
repetition of the old power-balancing politics or that 
Russia will renew its full strategic interests in Mongolia 
vis-à-vis China; it is more likely that Central Asian 
states are receiving the buffer role that Mongolia used to 
play during the Cold War. Hence, Mongolia’s policy is no 
longer expected to be that of a buffer state; instead, it 
will try to find other niches in the international scene 
and other patterns of engagement with its two neighbors 
based on its own national interest.  
b. The United States, Japan and Others: 
“The Third Neighbor” Paradigm   
    Another preferred means of power balancing in 20th 
century politics was the “third neighbor” paradigm. 
Although this orientation and subsequent policies stem from 
the earliest date of the declaration of independence in 
1911, the very term only is derivative of a rather 
rhetorical statement made by the then-U.S. Secretary of 
State James A. Baker III during his first visit to 
Ulaanbaatar in 1990. Therefore the United States, after 
only four years following the establishment of diplomatic 
relations, has joined, and in many instances seemingly 
acquired the leading position in, a group of Western and 
Third World countries that Mongolia has been attempting to 
“court” for counter-balancing both Russia and China ever 
since the 1910s.  
                     95 Trenin (2001), p. 326.   
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Initially, the most suitable country for that 
role was Japan, which, along with Russia, carved up its 
spheres of influence in Inner Mongolia. Japanese 
involvement grew after the Bolshevik takeover and by 
supporting the anti-Bolshevik factions that seized power in 
Southern Siberia, Japan indirectly encouraged the rise of 
the Pan-Mongolist movement. It backed the so-called 
“Semënov clique” in establishing an alternative Pan-
Mongolian government and pushed through to establish a 
unified Mongolian state, comprising Outer Mongolia, Inner 
Mongolia, and Buryat Mongolia. This regime even attempted 
to send its delegation to the Versailles Conference.96 
However, considering preservation of the autonomous 
government as a priority over risking its de facto 
independence by pursuing the near-utopian vision of 
“Greater Mongolia”, the monarchist government of Mongolia 
refused not only to join this self-proclaimed entity, but 
to extend recognition to it as well.97 Thus, as Dmitri 
Trenin evaluates it, “the specter of pan-Mongolism, 
historically seen in Russia as a vehicle for Japan’s policy 
aimed at weakening both Russia and China, however, was very 
short-lived.”98  
Even after the unsuccessful launch of a Pan-
Mongolian state, the Japanese pressed ahead with efforts to 
take advantage of the chaos caused by the Russian civil 
war. A large Japanese force, nominally part of an anti-
Bolshevik Allied Expeditionary Force intervening in eastern 
Siberia, had taken over much of the Trans-Siberian Railway 
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between Vladivostok and Lake Baikal.99 Japanese funds were 
provided to anti-Bolshevik elements, in order to prevent 
the Soviet government from establishing control in eastern 
Siberia and from obtaining too much influence in 
Mongolia.100 Still, the Japanese could not extend their 
presence due to the neutralist attitude of United States 
elements of the Allied Expeditionary Force, and Soviet 
forces gradually established control over Siberia.101  
After the Bolshevik victory in the Russian civil 
war, Japan resorted to its relative isolationism. 
Domestically, it was the period of the “Taisho Democracy,” 
with little emphasis on expansionism. The militarization of 
Japan in the late 1920s-1930s gave a new impetus for its 
expansionist policies in East Asia, camouflaged by such 
anti-imperialist ideological formulations, as “Asia for 
Asians,” and the so-called “Great East Asian Co-Prosperity 
Sphere.” After securing the annexation of Manchuria and 
establishing the puppet state of Manzhouguo (Manchu-Kuo), 
Japan began to appeal to Mongolian nationalism as the 
puppet “Mongolian Federated Government” was inaugurated in 
Inner Mongolia.102 However, by this time Mongolia was a 
full-fledged Soviet satellite and showed little, if any, 
response to such initiatives by the Japanese.     
During the Second World War the Mongolian army 
was maintained intact and served as a buffer force in the 
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Soviet Far East defense system. Moreover, in accordance 
with the 1941 Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, Japan 
committed to respect Mongolia's territorial integrity. As a 
result of the Yalta arrangements that designed the post-war 
world order, Mongolia gained its formal recognition by 
China, and more importantly, informal recognition of its 
status quo by the United States and Great Britain. Secure 
in its status, Ulaanbaatar expanded its other international 
ties. Diplomatic relations were established with the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the 
new Communist governments in Eastern Europe. The pattern of 
non-recognition by non-Communist countries was broken in 
December 1955, when diplomatic relations were established 
with India, with which Mongolia shares a Hindu-Buddhist 
cultural tradition.103 India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal 
Nehru relentlessly lobbied for Mongolia’s admission to the 
United Nations, which was blocked for fifteen years after 
1946 due to the Cold War power struggle and opposition from 
the Nationalist government representing China in the UN 
Security Council.  
In the meantime, a significant number of Western 
nations recognized Mongolia, with the United Kingdom being 
the first in January 1963, followed by France in April 
1965.104 Cultural and educational ties with Britain were 
very intensive given Mongolia’s isolation from the Western 
world. In fact, Britain was probably the only “true 
capitalist” nation to maintain the official relations with 
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Mongolia at the highest level and operating an embassy in 
Ulaanbaatar on a full scale.105  
Nevertheless, Mongolia’s search for a “third 
partner” was highly limited in success due to the Soviet-
dictated foreign policy: under Soviet pressure Mongolia’s 
leaders had to abandon their initiative to establish formal 
diplomatic relations with the United States and Japan, and 
many other states. With regards to Japan, given its past 
records of promoting Mongolian nationalism, the Soviets 
were especially concerned about possible ties. However, 
Japan and Mongolia formally exchanged diplomatic relations 
in February 1972, slightly before the Sino-Japanese 
normalization, itself caused by the “Nixon shocks,” and the 
cultural exchange has since elaborated.106  
The United States presented a different story. It 
was not until January 1987 when Ulaanbaatar and Washington 
exchanged diplomatic relations, though some significant 
drives to do so were undertaken by both sides in the past. 
The first high-ranking foreign dignitary to ever visit 
Mongolia, and the only one to do so until the 1950s, was 
the U.S. Vice President Henry Wallace in July 1944, who 
stopped for two days in Ulaanbaatar during his fact-finding 
mission in China and the USSR.107  
In the early 1960s Washington was seriously 
considering extending official recognition to the then-
Mongolian People’s Republic within the context of promoting 
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contacts with “non-bellicose Asian communist countries.”108 
The initiative, started by the Kennedy Administration, was 
repealed by JFK himself after meeting harsh opposition by 
the so-called “China Lobby,” which represented the 
interests of the Nationalist Government in Taipei that 
withdrew its recognition of Mongolia 1952, and which had 
influence over American conservative politicians affiliated 
with the U.S. Republican Party.109 The U.S. involvement in 
Vietnam also may have “contributed” to this turn of events. 
The Soviets finally gave approval to establish the 
diplomatic relations with the United States, which occurred 
in 1987, and to intensify Mongolian-Japanese relations, 
which, prior to that, were restricted to some limited 
cultural exchange.             
Two years later Mongolia took another step as an 
independent actor in the region. It became the third 
Communist state - after Hungary and Poland - to establish 
diplomatic exchange with South Korea, a country with which 
it previously had no contact in any sphere; thus launching 
the strong Asian accent in its policy.110 
The search for third partners did not only mean 
individual countries but a community of nations as well. 
This trend has become more apparent during the post-Cold 
war era, while before 1990 Mongolian multilateralism was 
confined to the Soviet bloc and the Third World’s non-
aligned nations.  
With regard to other Communist states, even there 
the Soviet dominance was obvious. Mongolia had restrained 
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relations with some of the “unorthodox” members of the 
Soviet bloc, such as Nicolae Ceauşescu’s Romania and 
Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh. Moreover, Mongolia was carefully 
guarded by Moscow from any type of contacts with the most 
“heretic” Communist states, such as relations with 
Yugoslavia and Albania, let alone China. In addition, 
Mongolian-North Korean relations heavily depended on those 
between Moscow and P’yŏngyang: Ulaanbaatar simply had to 
reflect Moscow’s unstable and shifting policies toward Kim 
Il-sung’s regime of “Juche socialism” balancing between 
Moscow and Beijing. Except for Ulaanbaatar’s loyalty, other 
Communist capitals elsewhere in Asia, such as Hanoi with 
its balancing behavior and P’yŏngyang with its preservation 
of “freedom of action”, were disappointing the Soviet 
diplomacy.111 It can be said as well that by virtue of its 
alliance with the USSR Mongolia had become one of the 
players in Cold War’s tri-polarity in East Asia.112  
In the post-Cold War period, the “third neighbor” 
paradigm was elevated to the status of semi-official 
conduct of behavior. Besides Russia and China, who share 
common physical borders, the two most important factors in 
Mongolia’s foreign policy (at least from the Mongolian 
point of view) have become the United States and Japan. In 
addition, robust ties to South Korea appear as another 
complementing factor. These countries and international 
organizations, such as the UN, where Mongolia has 
traditionally been active, and numerous regional 
institutions in sum constitute what the Mongolian academia 
refers to as the “third neighbor.” Therefore, at present 
                     111 Luttwak (1983), p. 100. 
112 Yahuda (1997), p. 79.  
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this term connotes a metaphorical vision of a virtual 
neighborhood and not any real-world political alliance.          
2.  The “Security Dilemma” 
With regards to its security, Mongolia is currently 
trapped in identifying its primary security concern. On the 
one hand, the interest of survival remains the top 
priority. However, the amalgamation of national, societal 
and individual security concerns provides a broader 
perception of it. In addition, the international context 
differs much from the Cold War era. State survival is no 
longer a primary concern for the reason that no direct 
threat to the nation’s independence and sovereignty is 
perceived from any of the neighboring or proximate states. 
This is facilitated by Mongolia’s amicable relations with 
the immediate two and the virtual “third” neighbors. But 
the notion of demographic survival (deriving from a 
population pressure from neighboring China), coupled with 
ideas of preserving the cultural individuality, makes the 
security perception flip. Therefore, the interest of 
survival is still prevalent within the academic and policy-
making community.  
On the other hand, because the interest of a small 
state is amalgamated in nature, the interests of those 
constituencies - individual and group – include the need 
for economic well-being, which is an unalienable interest 
of the state, too. Survival mentality may drive the policy 
toward either isolationist or globalist directions, but in 
neither case will the developmental objectives be properly 
met. Instead, they might risk being neglected or even 
sacrificed. This constitutes Mongolia’s current security 
dilemma – between the Scylla of self-preservation (or self-
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conservation) via power balancing and the Charibdes of 
accelerated development via regional cooperation and 
acceptance of the dominant position of one of its 
neighbors. These interests seem mutually exclusive, 
therefore competing, but a prudent policy of identifying 
the areas of dissent and reconciling them can turn them 
into mutually complementary interests.  
For this, the identity factor is brought back into our 
analysis. In the situation with divergent triple identity 
and competing dual interests, single policy equilibrium is 
difficult to attain. Identification of overlapping 
dimensions among the variations of identity and interest is 
conducted in the next section.  
3.  The “Buffer” Mentality   
There is another aspect of the view of the “two-
neighbors” vs. the “third neighbor” paradigms. These are 
often misinterpreted as the competing schools and practice 
in Mongolia’s strategic thinking. My argument is that both 
paradigms are variations of the realpolitik: balance-of-
power vs. bandwagoning. Though these options do not 
necessarily correspond to the two paradigms, historically 
the attempts to balance power were conducted by “courting” 
the possible “third neighbor,” and the bandwagoning was the 
usual pattern of Mongolia’s subordinance to Russia/Soviet 
Union in its interactions with China. Therefore both trends 
dramatically deplete from the notion of a “virtual third 
neighbor” and reflect what can be labeled as the “buffer 
mentality,” based on the self-assertion of a strategically 
important country and tightly interconnected to the 
primordial Central Asian identity.   
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Traditionally, Sino-Russian borderlands that served as 
a natural buffer between the two political entities are 
divided into the three geographical sectors: Middle, or 
Central Asia, Mongolia and the Far East.113 Of these, until 
the five Central Asian republics obtained independence from 
the Soviet Union in 1991, only Mongolia used to serve as a 
political buffer between the two powers, due to its 
independent status, however nominal it was under the Moscow 
protectorate. Throughout the 20th century Mongolia was 
politically dependent on the successive Russian regimes as 
a counterbalance and territorial buffer to the Chinese 
state, while receiving Russian/Soviet protection from the 
former.   
However, events of the late 1980s and the 1990s 
brought enormous changes in these triangular relations. 
Normalization of Sino-Soviet relations, disintegration of 
the Soviet Union and the establishment of the current 
regime of bilateral ties between Russia and China serve as 
the factors minimizing Mongolia’s geopolitical role. This 
situation is becoming even more complex as Mongolia 
normalized its own relations with China and embraced an 
entirely new, independent foreign policy for the first time 
with “balanced” relations with both of its neighbors. The 
evolution of triangulating relations between the major 
powers in the region and Mongolia’s current defense and 
economic capacity potentially excludes the role of buffer 
either between the two neighbors or between them and the 
others. Therefore, the understanding of the “third 
neighbor” paradigm based on power-balancing behavior is not 
                     113 William Arthur Douglas Jackson (1962): Russo-Chinese Borderlands. 
D. Van Hostard, p. iii 
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the timely and correct one; instead, its initial 
connotation of multilateralism must be asserted.         
D.  CORRELATION OF IDENTITY AND INTEREST 
1. Conflict of Identity and Interest: 
The Three Parameters  
The triple identity and dual security interest of 
Mongolia cause mutual conflict in the following three 
parameters: the weakness (size and leverage capacity) of 
the state that makes the power-balancing behavior 
inefficient, the risks associated with the so-called 
doctrine of “irreversible minimum” that is conducted by the 
great powers, and the lack of interdependence that might 
lead to a failure of the state.      
a. The “Realpolitik Trap”: Weak for Balancing  
and Cautious for Bandwagoning 
Small states do not inherently possess leverage 
against the surrounding powers. The very notion of the 
balance of power refers to at least relatively equal 
distribution of power and wealth among the players, and if 
lacking thereof, the small state conducting this policy 
must obtain other advantages over its neighbors: strategic 
geographical location, assets of valuable natural resources 
and/or a rival political ideology and economic system that 
could challenge existing order in the neighboring states. 
Mongolia, as was discussed in the previous section, is 
losing its buffer role to the new independent states of 
Central Asia, which in sum (as a region) possess much more 
strategic and economic leverage than Mongolia does. In 
terms of the systemic difference, Mongolia offers no 
competitiveness in the economy (market transformation in 
both Russia and China makes their economic system not 
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significantly different from that of Mongolia, albeit with 
much greater size and attraction). In terms of political 
development, the position of an island of stable democracy 
landlocked between Communist China and unstable Russia with 
strong resurgence of the old ideas offers some comparative 
advantage. However, the overall systemic difference between 
Russia and China is minimal, which underscores the 
possibility of Mongolia’s political buffer position between 
the two. In addition, the interests of major outside powers 
do not seriously conflict with those of Russia and China 
and therefore undercuts Mongolia’s quest for a buffer 
position between the two neighbors and the third ones. 
Ironically, Mongolia’s foremost achievements – stable 
democratic governance, steady development, predictable 
international behavior and lack of domestic problems that 
directly affect international and regional security (such 
as the links of certain constituencies to terrorist 
organizations) – are the factors behind its lack of 
substantial leverage in dealing with other nations.  
While recognizing its relative weakness in the 
balance of power, Mongolia is nevertheless too cautious of 
bandwagoning, largely due to the mentality set as a legacy 
of the period of Soviet domination. The communist past is 
reflected in the two forms of phobia, which, though they 
have credible merits, must be challenged in order to 
reflect the realities of the contemporary period. The same 
key determinants of Mongolia’s stance through the Sino-
Soviet tug-of-war point to the current cautiousness. First 
is the will to reassert maximum independence, as a nation 
having been dominated by a foreign power for decades. 
Second is the fear of losing the demographic, cultural and 
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economic independence to a powerful neighbor. A well-
respected Mongolian statesman of pro-democracy orientation 
stated in 1997 at the VIII International Congress of 
Mongolists that “we have experienced being in the Soviet-
led COMECON, and [should be] cautious about the China-led 
APEC.”114 Such cultural phobia, again, has its merits but 
mostly is a political construction developed during the 
intra-Communist “Cold War” and therefore the identity 
politics aimed at the reconciliation of it to the interest 
is needed.                     
c. The Risk of Great Power Politics:  
“Irreversible Minimum” Revisited 
One of the world’s most prominent Mongolists, 
Owen Lattimore, described the differences between a colony 
and a satellite by defining the latter as “a country under 
the influence or control of a protector that requires and 
often forcefully coerces restructuring of the satellite 
country in the protector’s image,” while the former is 
“prevented from these assimilating duties.”115 During the 
Soviet control, Mongolia presented a very unique case by 
both being restructured in the Soviet image yet having its 
nominal independence preserved and not forced into 
assimilating into the Russian culture at large.  
Lattimore also introduced the “doctrine of the 
irreversible minimum” to describe how protector countries 
like the Soviet Union could establish and maintain control 
of border countries while not actually annexing them.  In 
regards to creating a Mongolian satellite, Lattimore refers 
                     114 I was present at the panel when the former Prime Minister Dashiin 
Byambasüren said these words. The quote is not documented, and 
therefore the translation is my own and relies on memory recall.   
115 Owen Lattimore (1955): Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia. 
E.J. Brill Leiden, p. 44. 
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to the Soviets’ desire for a cushion to protect its 
Siberian frontier from invasion by the Chinese. In offering 
the Mongolian government an opportunity for independence 
coupled to economic support and tied to a promise of 
protection against the Chinese and Japanese, the Soviets 
gained an irreversible advantage requiring minimum 
expenditures of resources, secure in the knowledge that the 
Mongolians would not reverse the agreement recognizing that 
their country was better under Soviet protection.116  The 
Mongolians did profit from this arrangement, not just in 
the receipt of protection but also through an increase in 
trade opportunities. 
The “irreversible minimum” did not cease to exist 
with the end of Mongolian subordination to Moscow. Russia’s 
contemporary policies toward Mongolia can be described as 
bordering between negligence and awareness of the necessity 
to apply the age-old “irreversible minimum” if needed. With 
one eye on China’s expanding economic and political 
presence in its own far Eastern backyard while pursuing the 
politics of the “strategic partnership,” Moscow will have 
to pull Mongolia’s identity gravity to Eurasia/Central 
Asia.117 However, Moscow will be unlikely to consider 
Mongolia strategically to be as important as its former 
constituent republics of Central Asia. The basis for such 
an approach is the same reason that helped Moscow to 
“spend” minimum investment for its strategic interests vis-
à-vis China: it is the nearly guaranteed awareness that 
Mongolia will depend on any power to minimize its 
connections with China. It is true of not only Russia, but 
                     116 Lattimore (1955), p. 44. 
117 Trenin (1999), pp. 76-77. 
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of the other so-called “third neighbors,” most notably, the 
United States. The notion that Mongolia can exploit the 
systemic (political and economic) differences between the 
United States and China and benefit from it in the form of 
a security guarantee from the latter is merely an illusion 
that can best be defined as irrationality in pursuing 
interest. According to an anonymous American official 
source, in 1996-97 “the Mongolian government even 
approached Washington with a plan for new military security 
pact,” but “this proposal was dismissed as unenforceable 
and unacceptably provocative towards Beijing.”118 An 
American diplomat commented: “It’s not going to happen. No 
one on the planet can guarantee the security of 
Mongolia.”119  
What Mongolia needs to understand is that this 
attitude of the American government is easily justifiable 
from the three major schools of foreign policy thought 
persistent in the American political spectrum. By 
“spectrum” I connote mostly the cross-partisan worldviews, 
although certain generalizations can be made in the policy 
orientations of the Republicans, the Democrats and other 
groups, such as the Libertarians. For political 
conservatives and realists in the international relations 
field, the basic premise is that the United States pursues 
its own security and economic interests, mostly in dealing 
vis-a-vis regional powers, as China. Unless Mongolia 
possesses significant leverage vis-à-vis China and/or 
Russia (which it, according to the findings of this thesis, 
does not), no other power would be interested in investing 
                     118 Nate Thayer (1997): “Forward Steppes,” in Far Eastern Economic 
Review, March 27, 1997, p. 20. 
119 Thayer (1997), p. 20. 
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a security guarantee. The best expression of the U.S. 
strategic thinking based on the conservative realism can be 
found in Henry Kissinger’s words:  
 
[F]or the foreseeable decades, the United 
States possesses diplomatic, economic, and 
military advantages allowing it to shape the 
future without resorting to preemptive 
confrontation with China … The issue is not 
whether to oppose Chinese attempts to 
dominate Asia. If they occur, they must be 
resisted. But at a moment when the capacity 
for its does not exist, what is the purpose 
of a confrontational strategy conducted for 
its own sake? What is to be the strategic 
goal? In what way does America gain by 
conducting relations with China by analogy 
to the Cold war unless Beijing gives the 
United States no other choice? … A prudent 
American leadership should balance the risk 
of stoking Chinese nationalism against the 
gains from short-term pressures.120   
 
For liberals, the idea of United States investing 
in the security of small states at the expense of 
antagonizing large partners in trade and international 
institutions is also absurd. Some libertarian analysts also 
advocate forms of strategic disengagement that could limit 
the opportunities for Mongolian-U.S. strategic 
cooperation.121 The main objective of such a conservative 
policy is that a disengaged United States, and regional 
powers in Asia, namely China and Japan, must find out a way 
                     120 Henry Kissinger (2001): Does America Need A Foreign Policy? 
Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century. Simon & Shuster, p. 148. 
121 For further references on the libertarian viewpoint, see Edward 
A. Olsen (2002): US National Defense for the Twenty-First Century: The 
Grand Exit Strategy. Frank Cass Publishers and Ivan Eland (2001): 
Putting “Defense” Back into U.S. Defense Policy: Rethinking U.S. 
Security in the Post-Cold War World. Praeger Publishers. 
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of cooperative, and at the same time, power balancing 
interaction with each other that is based on a U.S. 
military presence to sustain a more stable order for 
regional security and economic development. For Mongolia, 
such a development would mean more opportunities rather 
than an increased threat. If, hypothetically, Mongolia 
could attract the U.S. involvement on a similar scale to 
that of the USSR during the Cold War, and then the United 
States were to strategically disengage after some time, the 
country would risk repeating the situation of the same 
unfamiliarity with, and marginalization from, the Asian 
security and cooperation practices, as happened in the 
immediate wake of the Cold War. 
Thus, the whole notion of a security guarantee 
provided by a superpower, though based on rational concerns 
for political independence and demographic survival, 
nevertheless reflects the state of Sino-Mongolian relations 
prior to the normalization. In addition, certain “myths,” 
socially constructed during the Soviet domination, have 
turned out to be very durable and persist within segments 
of Mongolia’s civil society up to these days. They remain 
the major obstacle in the full-scale identification of the 
country as an East Asian nation.  
d. Independence – Interdependence                 
= Failing State 
    The third parameter is that of independence vs. 
interdependence. As the process of globalization is 
underway, the idea of “strict” or “perpetual” neutrality 
ceases to be a plausible solution for the maintenance of a 
state’s sovereignty. Nations without well-defined 
identification with regional institutions, or those 
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pursuing isolationist policies are becoming more labeled as 
the “rogue” states. If their international behavior is 
odious, and even if they behave not as odiously, the risk 
of state failure threatens them. The only successful story 
of a maximum sovereignty outside regional developments 
could be Switzerland, but even there, the identity is 
firmly and convergently European; and this nation has 
accumulated enough capacities to project itself as a 
respected actor in world politics. In nearly all other 
situations, the rules of the “golden straitjacket” push 
states to adopt and to be co-opted into the process of 
globalization via the means of regionalization.122 While 
this does not connote the destruction of identity, it 
enforces the necessity for stepping ahead from exclusive 
nationalism as a prerequisite for not only the economic 
incentives, but for the security guarantee as well. The 
path to undertake this transformation lies in the 
reconciliation of these conflicting areas of identity and 
interest, and in doing it by the means of identity 
politics.     
2. Reconciliation of Identity and Interest:  
Dichotomy of Construction and Deconstruction 
Identity, being a cumulative set of national and 
societal ideas about a country’s place in the world, 
matters in foreign policy. So does interest, as the key 
factor behind any rational decision by the state as a 
single actor. While identity can shape the interest and 
serve as the policy pathway in an absence of a single 
equilibrium with regards to the interest, interest, too, 
                     122 For further references on the “Golden Straitjacket” paradigm, see 
Thomas L. Friedman (2000): The Lexus and the Olive Tree. First Anchor 
Books, pp. 101-110. 
86 
can narrow the policy-making pathway for a state with 
divergent identities. The methodology for their mutual 
complementarity is choosing the overlapping areas of 
identity and interest, and prioritizing them in terms of 
policy orientation. As this chapter stipulates, Mongolia 
faces the trilemma in terms of the identity and dilemma in 
terms of the security interest.  
However, the three versions of identity and the two 
dimensions of interest do not have equal weight on policy. 
From the identity perceptions the East Asian and 
cosmopolitan ones have visible priority over the indigenous 
Central Asian one, e.g. it is the triumph of cultural 
crystallization and socio-political construction over 
primordiality. As for the national interest, the real 
dilemma is that between openness to the West (both values 
and assurances) by balancing the powers and openness to 
East Asian regional dynamics, including those of China 
(developmental incentives), which seems often a too 
contradictory choice from a Mongolian perspective. The next 
logical question is, is the idea of a security guarantee 
provided by the “third neighbor(s)” a rational interest, or 
is it a form of the small states’ irrationality and wishful 
thinking? And should or should not the identity enter 
within this tug as a tiebreaker or should the interest 
defined first act as a roadmap to make a preference in the 
politics of identity? My argument is that the three 
parameters of the conflict between identity and interest 
provide us an initial step of defining the priority in 
national interest. A simplified formulation of such 
correlation would be that, being a small state without 
sufficient self-defense capabilities and much attraction 
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for the real incentives of the “third neighbors,” Mongolia 
should recognize regionalism in East Asia as its foreign 
policy priority, as the factor that will guarantee the 
security assurance and economic acceleration.  This should 
be conducted by stressing the East Asian identity and 
prioritizing this over others, regardless of the inherent 
phobia that causes large segments of domestic 
constituencies to retain pessimism. Many of the factors 
that contributed to the Sinophobia derive from the 
traditional hostility between the two nations, but much 
were nothing but the constructed “myths” that served the 
justification for Soviet military and political presence in 
Mongolia during the Cold War. The effects of this thorough 
indoctrination can be found within numerous informal 
statements made by the officials, academics and citizens. 
An example is seen in the words of (an anonymous) 
journalist in Ulaanbaatar: 
 
The hostilities between Mongolia and China, 
we cannot forget. Ties between Mongolia and 
China have been nonexistent. The end of the 
Cold War in Europe was also the end of the 
Cold War in Mongolia, and we have chosen 
this path to the future – democracy and 
capitalism instead of the Chinese way.123 
 
Though the last portion of his/her statement raises no 
doubt, the reference toward the Sino-Mongolian relations is 
disproportionately exaggerated. At this point, reconciling 
Mongolia’s divergent identity perception to its security 
and economic interests requires the deconstruction of some 
mythicized aspects of identity and construction of a 
                     123 Thayer (1997), p. 20. 
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regional identity. However, for a democratic society, such 
a task cannot be single-handedly performed by any 
government institution. The best solution might be finding 
and implementing certain policy orientations that can help 
constructing a new (renewed) identity. The final chapter 
will address some examples of the attitudes among the East 
Asian states toward one another, and will look at some 
possible models for deconstructing the “mythical” 
perceptions.     
E. CHAPTER FINDINGS 
In correlation with the findings of the first chapter, 
I come to the following conclusions on Mongolia’s current 
geopolitical situation through the prism of identity and 
interest: 
- Mongolia is a nation with divergent identity, 
thus faces the “identity trilemma”; 
- Being a small state with divergent identity, 
Mongolia risks the outcome of marginalization 
from the core areas of the major civilizations, 
thus being isolated from the global developmental 
and security trends;   
- Its national interests are mutually conflicting 
between security (survival) and economy 
(development), with strong overtones of 
irrational interests (maximum independence from 
the neighbors’ influence by enlisting a third 
power’s guarantee), thus constituting the 
“security dilemma”; 
- The three parameters of the conflict between 
identity and interest, namely the “realpolitik 
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trap,” the “irreversible minimum” and the 
“independence minus interdependence” plus an 
exaggerated self-perception of a buffer state 
might hinder the nation’s successful self-
realization in the age of globalization; 
- Sinophobia is the key factor causing ambiguity in 
identity construction and interest formulation; 
- Therefore, taking the mutual causal impact 
between identity and interest into consideration, 
Mongolia’s optimal choice for foreign policy 
could be that of the East Asian orientation, 
deriving from its cultural identity and rational 



















































IV. REGIONAL POLITICS THROUGH THE PRISM 
OF IDENTITY AND INTEREST 
 
A.  CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter is designed to look at some regional 
trends within Asia through the prism of identity and 
interest. The objective of the chapter is two-fold: to 
identify the prevailing tendencies in intra-regional 
interactions with regards to the two factors of foreign 
policy, and to provide the cases that can serve as lessons 
or recommendations for Mongolia’s policy-making. First, in 
relation to the primordial identity and the “buffer” 
mentality that Mongolia possesses, Central Asia’s current 
problems and future prospects are addressed in some detail. 
This section would answer the question of how much identity 
construction is going on in that region and why do the 
Central Asian states gradually replace Mongolia as a buffer 
zone between Russia and China. Second, in relation to 
Mongolia’s civilizational identity, East Asia’s intra-
regional politics is examined. 
For that purpose, the chapter looks at the two sub-
regions of East Asia separately and analyzes the 
construction of a common identity (or lack thereof) in 
each, and how it leads to (or impedes) the shaping of 
common security and economic interests. Here I again turn 
to the neo-liberal school as the provider of a common 
ground between the constructivist view of the primacy of 
identity and the realist view of the primacy of interest. 
Finally, the chapter puts forward a question about what 
92 
would be the priority in Mongolia’s foreign policy in 
coming years and how it could be best achieved.   
B. CENTRAL ASIA: A WESTWARD SHIFTED BUFFER 
1. Background 
Central Asia is geographically and culturally linked 
to four important sub-regions – East Asia (through China 
and Mongolia), South Asia (through Afghanistan and 
Pakistan), Eurasia/Europe (through Russia and Turkey) and 
the Middle East (through Iran) and has a unique position 
among them. Five states comprising the region – Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz 
Republic - obtained independence on December 25, 1991, 
immediately following the dissolution of the USSR.124 Thus, 
Central Asia has not previously been considered a separate 
region in world politics and, therefore, most of the 
policies of the five states located in the region are in 
the formative stage, as are the policies toward them of its 
immediate neighbors and outside powers. 
The states of Central Asia represent an anomaly among 
nearly all the former Communist states and former member 
states of the Soviet Union. At present, all five states 
lack democratic governance; the regimes vary from 
totalitarian125 to autocratic pseudo-democracy.126 Market-
oriented reforms were conducted in all of the states; 
however, reforms were aborted in Tajikistan127 and 
                     124 The actual dates of each country’s formal declaration of 
independence vary from state to state. 
   125 As the regime of Saparmurat Niyazov in Turkmenistan; see Larry 
Diamond (1999): Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. Johns 
Hopkins University Press, pp. 279-280. 
   126 As the regime of Askar Akayev in the Kyrgyz Republic; see 
Diamond (1999), pp. 279-280. 
127 Primarily caused by devastating civil war in the mid-1990s.  
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Turkmenistan.128 Kyrgyz economic reforms, despite an initial 
promising start, have likely failed due to incompetence of 
the state apparatus and a weak financial situation.129 
Hence, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan can be named as countries 
vying for regional leadership politically, economically and 
demographically.  
In addition, the foreign policy choices and priorities 
of these states are not common to those of one another. The 
policies of Kazakhstan and Tajikistan are considered the 
most Moscow-oriented, while Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz 
Republic hosted the air bases for U.S. operations in 
Afghanistan. Most recently, Uzbekistan strongly supported 
the U.S.-led coalition war against Iraq. These relations 
are further complicated by the very intensive and 
increasing degree of cooperation between the Kyrgyz and 
Chinese militaries.130 Turkmenistan follows a highly 
rhetorical policy of “perpetual neutrality” and remains 
isolated from the rest of the world, with its rich oil and 
gas resources compensating for the disadvantage of lacking 
an open foreign policy.131      
 
 
                     128 Though Turkmenistan possesses the greatest asset of natural 
resources, the economic stagnation is caused by the increasingly 
autarkic nature of economic policy.  
129 Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg, ed. (2002): Strategic 
Asia 2002-2003: Asian Aftershocks. National Bureau of Asian Research 
Publishing, p. 233. 
130 The Kyrgyz Army and the People’s Liberation Army of China 
conducted a small – scale exercize in the Kyrgyz territory in 2002, but 
the significance of this event was in the fact that it was the first 
exercize of the PLA outside of Chinese soil.  
   131 Filip Noubel (2002): “Golden Century of the Turkmens”: A Bleak 
Picture of Village Life in the Desert. URL: <http://www. 
eurasianet.org/departments/culture/articles/eav102502. shtml> 
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2. Current Geopolitical Situation 
The current geopolitical situation in Central Asia is 
characterized by the problems the states in the region face 
and the interests major outside powers vested in them. 
a.  Existing Issues  
Ironically, serious issues that are present in 
Central Asia create concern among major powers and cause 
them to pay increased attention in order to prevent the 
exacerbation of those issues, categorized as follows:  
-  Religious Extremism: Radical Islam has the 
potential of becoming an increasingly influential force in 
Central Asia. Traditionally, Central Asians are Muslims, 
though some, like the nomadic Kazakh and Kyrgyz, are 
relatively late converts to Islam, whereas the Uzbeks and 
Tajiks are considered the heirs of great medieval Islamic 
civilizations of Bukhara and Samarkand.132 Most of the 
region’s population follows the Hanafi school of Sunni 
Islam, perceived to be the most moderate brand of this 
religion.133 In addition, a significant influence is 
attributed to the Sufi Brotherhood, a Muslim mystical 
movement, and the Ismaili branch of Shiism.134  
                     132 Oliver Roy (2000): The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations. 
New York University Press, pp. 7-8. 
   133 The main threat in Central Asia, although traditionally not 
influential, is the growth of Salafi Islam, which preaches total 
rejection of modernity, of culture and the arts. Salafi beliefs are 
similar to those advocated by al-Qaeda and are also linked with 
Wahhabism. Among the five states, Uzbekistan, the Kyrgyz Republic and 
Tajikistan face serious problems with illegal radical Islamist 
movements, some which have links to various Afghan warlords of the same 
ethnic decent across the border. For further details see: Ahmed Rashid 
(2002): Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia. Yale 
University Press, p. 26. 
134 Predominantly among the Badokhshoni (Pâmiri) Tajiks. The Ismaili 
sect, founded and led by Aga Khan Dynasty, is seeking to increase its 
influence in the region by such measures, as opening the Ismaili-
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-  Ethnic conflicts: Another issue of concern 
is inter-ethnic conflicts of various scales throughout the 
region that would seriously threaten regional stability. 
The Central Asian states are populated with many ethnic 
groups, of which four prominent groups are Turkic-speaking 
peoples of common descent.135 Indo-Iranian Tajiks and the 
Slavic Russians constitute significant population groups.136 
Conflicts among these groups, varying from local clashes 
(in the Kyrgyz Republic) to all-out civil war (in 
Tajikistan) often employ religious sentiments among the 
population. In addition, lack of civic national identity in 
many parts of the region promotes tribalism and clan-based 
interest conflicts that have potential to undermine the 
fragile framework of dialogue.137   
-  Poverty: Issues such as population growth 
and poverty must be immediately addressed. From the Soviet 
period the region has known unprecedented population growth 
despite also having a very high infant mortality rate. Most 
of the societies are predominantly rural; with unsuccessful 
or initial market reforms living standards of the average 
citizens remain very low. These factors contribute to 
social upheaval and dissatisfaction with government 
policies, which at present is oppressed by authoritarian 
regimes. 
                     
sponsored University of Central Asia in Khorog, Autonomous Province of 
Quhistoni Badokhshon of Tajikistan; see: Victoria Panfilova (2002): 
“Ismaility Smotryat v Budushcheye.” (Rus., “The Ismailis are Looking at 
the Future”) Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 21, 2002. URL: 
<http://ng.ru/courier/2002-10-21/12_award.shtml> 
   135 Roy (2000), pp. 2-5. 
136 Roy (2000), pp. 15-17. 
137 Roy (2000), pp. 23-24. 
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-  Human Rights: The political situation in 
general and bad human rights records in particular are the 
major concerns of any Western government in dealing with 
Central Asian states. According to the Human Rights Watch 
and Freedom House survey of the last decade, none of the 
regimes qualify as fully “free” and “democratic” 
government.138 The Kyrgyz Republic, the only country 
rewarded with initial optimism for political and economic 
liberalization by international financial institutions, has 
reverted back to authoritarian rule, although its regime 
remains the most open and least oppressive one in the 
region.139 In all republics, political oppositions are 
fragmented and weak – through both oppression as well as 
their own misconduct of political affairs. No credible 
alternative and/or platform have ever been presented to the 
population. In addition, governments accuse the opposition 
that they established links with underground Islamist 
movements threatening to destroy the secular state. Reports 
in Central Asia say the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
(IMU) has merged with other regional radical Muslim groups 
and with China’s Uighur separatists to form the Islamic 
Movement of Central Asia.140 
-  International rivalries: Although the Soviet 
dominance left Central Asia with no directly conferred 
territorial disputes, the current international boundaries 
are inherited from artificially-carved internal 
administrative borders of the former USSR. Coupled with 
                     
138 Diamond (1999), pp. 279-280. 
139 Ellings and Friedberg, ed. (2002), p. 232. 
140 Ibragim Alimbekov (2002): IMU Reportedly Expands, Prepares to 
Strike Western Targets. URL: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/ 
insight/articles/eav102902. shtml> 
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clan-based sentiments, border clashes are not unlikely in 
the future if the political and economic situation will 
destabilize. At present, mutual accusations and distrust 
have already become part of the relations between these 
five states.  
-  Environmental damage: Drying of the Aral Sea 
and a shortage of water supply caused by canalization 
projects during the Soviet period are primary issues of 
concern in the environmental field. Though no short-term 
solution is possible, foreign direct investment and 
projects are vital in solving this long-term problem. 
c. Outside Interests  
In response to the potential threat of radical 
Islam in Central Asia, the United States, Russia and China 
are emphasizing security assistance and engagement with 
regional governments.141 Even though human rights records 
show that Central Asian states further elaborated domestic 
repression, “since the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks, the U.S. policy is directed by the engagement.”142 
This strategy hopefully will encourage the five national 
governments to conduct gradual liberalization. There are 
four areas of primary interest of all three major powers 
with regards to Central Asia:  
-  Strategic: Central Asia is the outermost 
frontier of the Islamic world. Its proximity to Russia, 
China, Afghanistan and Iran in particular - and the Islamic 
world, in broader terms – make this region a natural buffer 
                     
   141 Ariel Cohen (2002): U.S. Officials Relying on Engagement 
Strategy to Promote Change in Central Asia:  URL: 
<http://www.eurasianet.org/ departments/insight/articles/eav111402. 
shtml> 
142 Cohen (2002). 
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among the powers seeking hegemony in Asia. Central Asia 
offers one of the basing areas to the U.S. forces within 
the context of the War on Terrorism. The same arguments, 
though with the connotation of the anti-drug operations and 
border security, can be made about Russia’s interest in the 
region. 
-  Economic: The region, especially its western 
frontiers adjacent to the Caspian Sea, is abundant with oil 
and natural gas. Other areas within Central Asia are rich 
with gold, uranium and silver. Economic integration with 
the outside world will promote development in this 
impoverished region. 
-  Political: Continued political and economic 
exchange between the United States and the Central Asian 
governments may assist in the liberalization of the 
regimes. The region, therefore, can be crucial in promoting 
democracy in Asia and the Muslim world. For Russia and 
China, maintenance of the secular regimes serves their 
interest in containing the rise of radical Islamism and 
spillover into their own frontiers. 
In sum, Central Asia can be considered a new 
buffer, shifted from Mongolia westwards following the end 
of the Cold War. The region has greater importance than 
Mongolia in any bilateral or triangulating relations among 
the major powers by virtue of both its opportunities 
offered and problems demanding immediate attention. For any 
one of the three most interested powers (Russia, China and 
the United States), Mongolia does not provide a central 
geopolitical position approximate to the three factors of 
concern – the two others plus the Islamic world. It is less 
endowed with valuable resources, and however ironically, 
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does not face the same problems in such great scales that 
may trigger the instability, so that the major powers have 
to pay attention. In addition, there are no visible signs 
of building a common identity and shaping the mutually 
benefiting interests. Therefore, from both the 
constructivist and the realist view, Central Asia cannot be 
regarded as a serious option for Mongolia’s foreign policy.       
C. EAST ASIA: A DYNAMIC SOUTH AND A RELUCTANT NORTH 
1.  Intra-Regional Diversity 
In sharp contrast to Central Asia, East Asia offers 
Mongolia a viable arena for multilateral and bilateral 
cooperation and is not considered to be a buffer zone of 
the major players. Mongolia’s foreign policy behavior has 
been opportunistic toward this region.  
In 1994 Junichi Goto and Koichi Hamada analyzed the 
short- and mid-term projections for intense regional 
cooperation and identified three causal factors determining 
that preconditions for regional integration were 
“favorable”:  
 
Compatibility of the degree of confluence in 
macroeconomic variables in selected countries 
of Asia to those of Europe; the magnitude of 
the possible gains from trade liberalization 
among Asian countries that would constitute a 
strong incentive to create free-trade 
agreements; and high degree of factor 
mobility among East Asian countries as 
serving as rationale for creating a common 
currency area in East Asia.143  
 
                     
143 Junichi Goto and Koichi Hamada (1994): “Economic Preconditions 
for Asian Regional Integration,” in Ito Takatoshi and Anne O. Krueger, 
ed. (1994): Macroeconomic Linkage: Savings, Exchange Rates, and Capital 
Flows. University of Chicago Press, pp. 359-385. 
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After nearly a full decade since this research was 
conducted, efforts by nation-states to foster East Asian 
cooperation were rewarded with certain achievements. 
Expressing a commitment to free-trade agreements has become 
an increasingly attractive move for the region’s national 
leaders: 
 
ASEAN’s reaffirmation of ASEAN + 3; … ASEAN 
+ China proposal, and … plan for a Japan - 
ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Partnership are 
all signs that nations are looking to trade 
to inject spark into their economies… 
China’s entry into the World Trade 
Organization and the shift in foreign direct 
investment to China spurred all the talk 
about cooperation144  
 
However, there are several limitations to both 
Mongolia’s satisfactory participation in the East Asian 
regionalism, and to the evolution of the latter as such. 
Unlike Western Europe or North America, East Asia has no 
strong institutions to facilitate the process of regional 
dialogue. Even in the economic sphere there is an obvious 
incompatibility. Despite the suggestion of favorable 
preconditions, Goto and Hamada have also concluded that 
“close interrelation of the East Asian countries, like 
those of the European Community … does not necessarily lead 
to an economic justification of East Asian free trade 
area.”145 In terms of identity, cultural and political bonds 
are not as strong as in the above-mentioned regions. The 
Cold War still continues in the region, and a major 
                     
144 Frank-Jürgen Richter (2002): “Prospects for An Asian NAFTA,” in 
Far Eastern Economic Review, April 18, 2002. 
145 Goto and Hamada (1994), pp. 359-385 
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conflict (the Korean War) has technically never ended. 
Political and economic systems vary greatly from one 
country to another. Above all, the diversity – not as much 
among the states – but between the two distinct 
geographical and geo-economic sub-regions of the broader 
region of East Asia seems to be a decisive factor in 
affecting the regional integration. Hence, the patterns of 
construction of regional identity within Southeast and 
Northeast Asia are examined in the following two sections.       
2.  Southeast Asian Regionalism: An Exemplar Case 
Southeast Asian regionalism represents a unique case 
study. It reveals several trends of special interest for 
this research. First is the construction of a common 
identity from among a conglomerate of crystallized 
identities, the former being closely related to a 
primordial identity of all states in the region. Second is 
a reconciliation of the security and economic interests of 
the respective states. Third is an emerging model for 
reconciliation of identity and interest for the Northeast 
Asian states, which began to gravitate if not toward 
Southeast Asia per se, then toward the pattern of 
interaction that the region exemplifies. Fourth, an example 
of a post-Cold War identity construction and interest 
evaluation by a formerly Soviet satellite state, Vietnam, 
can represent a possible prescription for Mongolia’s search 






a.  Amalgam of Cultures and Regimes 
 Southeast Asia, as opposed to Northeast Asia, had 
and has much more opportunity for relatively even 
multilateral cooperation, with already existing structures 
that are flexible enough to accept regional countries with 
different political, cultural and socio-economic systems. 
The sub-region encompasses ten nations representing four 
major religious traditions and a wide range of political 
regimes. The faith adhered to by the majority of 
population, and consequently, the dominant religious and 
cultural tradition in Thailand, Myanmar146, Laos and 
Cambodia is Buddhism; whereas in Vietnam it shares this 
function with Confucianism. In Malaysia, Brunei and 
Indonesia Islam has played that role, while in the 
Philippines it was Christianity (Roman Catholicism). 
Singapore represents a multiethnic and multicultural state, 
where all the aforementioned traditions plus Hinduism exist 
as cultural factors. The latter also remains a factor in 
parts of Indonesia.  
As for the types of government, Southeast Asian 
nations include many variations. There are authoritarian 
regimes of two types – military junta (Myanmar) and one-
                     146 The name of this country is an issue of controversy. The military 
regime called the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC; prior 
known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council, or SLORC), which 
seized power in the 1988 coup d’etat has renamed the official English 
version of the country’s name from Burma to Myanmar. The democratic 
opposition and the U.S. Government does not recognize this name and 
continue to refer to Burma; this is based on Washington’s non-
recognition of the regime. However, disconnected from the political 
context, the word “Myanmar” appears to be (as is claimed by the regime) 
a more accurate phonetic transliteration of a local name for the 
country. Herein I follow this tradition, also based on the fact that 
the Mongolian Government, as well as the UN uses this term for 
reference. For further information on the name issue, see David 
Steinberg (2001): Burma: the State of Myanmar. Georgetown University 
Press, pp. xi-xii. 
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party states (Vietnam and Laos).147 Though in July 2003 it 
held a multi-party election, Cambodia is also categorized 
as a “non-democracy” due to the influence of its military 
in the politics.148 Other nations can be labeled as 
democracies, but in accordance with the Freedom House 
classifications, “electoral democracies” that practice the 
“partly free” environment for political and civil liberties 
constitute the majority.149 Only Thailand and the 
Philippines are classified under the category of “liberal 
democracy” with the status of “free” nation.150  
In terms of systemic variety in national 
economies, with the possible exception of Myanmar there is 
no clear-cut statist/autarkic economy in Southeast Asia, 
but at least two different variations of market economy 
remain in the region. Vietnam and Laos apply the Chinese-
style limited marketization, and in all other countries a 
blend of free market and statist capitalism prevails.151  
These nations with otherwise “uncompromising” 
variety in cultural, political and economic systems they 
possess, nevertheless were able to create the most viable 
regional institution within East Asia and continue to act 
as a driving force behind the intra-Asian dialogue. ASEAN 
and its broader regional forum, the ARF, have been able to 
bring the Northeast Asian states into a mechanism for 
promoting mutual security and cooperation. The phenomenon 
                     147 Huntington (1996), p. 132. 
148 Freedom House Country Rating Survey (2002). URL: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/countryratings> 
149 Freedom House (2002). 
150 Freedom House (2002). 
151 For further information on the economic systems of Southeast 
Asian states, see Ashok K. Dutt, ed. (1985): Southeast Asia: Realm of 
Contrasts. Westview Press. 
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of such capability despite the compelling differences is, 
perhaps, what has been both praised and criticized vividly 
in Western academic circles – the so-called “ASEAN Way” and 
the related principle of non-interference.152 For a number 
of scholars, these two are identical terms and represent 
strength of an Asian social and political construction 
based on the cultural heritage. Jürgen Rüland argues that 
“ASEAN’s collective identity [is] crystallized in the 
revered principle of non-intervention,” however, he does 
not give much credit to the adherence to this principle by 
respective national governments by calling it “a pious 
myth.”153 Amitav Acharaya shares this point of view and 
attributes the principle of musyawarah, originally tested 
among Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia as “the basis 
for setting differences among members, [which] would later 
form ASEAN’s central approach to regional interaction and 
cooperation.”154 Catharin Dalpino and David Steinberg, on 
the contrary, see a certain confluence between the two and 
point out this strength as simultaneously being the 
manifestation of the weakness of Western-orchestrated 
security mechanisms:  
 
The United States chafes at what it sees as 
the turgid pace of the ASEAN process, but 
this irritation masks a larger reality: 
attempts by Washington to introduce its own 
vision of a regional framework for Asia have 
historically been doomed. ASEAN was 
                     152 Amitav Acharaya (2001): Constructing a Security Community in 
Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order. Routledge, pp. 
57-60. 
153 Jürgen Rüland (2000): “ASEAN and the Asian Crisis: Theoretical 
Implications and Practical Consequences for Southeast Asian 
Regionalism,” in The Pacific Review, Vol. 13, No. 3/2000, p. 439. 
154 Amitav Acharaya (2000): The Quest for Identity: The International 
Relations of Southeast Asia. Oxford University Press, pp. 82-83.  
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established a few years after the collapse of 
the U.S.-led Southeast Asia Treaty 
Organization (SEATO), which failed from the 
beginning to follow the model of its European 
counterpart. As recently as the mid-1990s, 
Asian leaders, even democratic ones, rejected 
a U.S. attempt to form an Asian human rights 
network modeled after the Helsinki Accords … 
Washington is in no better position to launch 
its own version of regional cooperation on 
counterterrorism. Political constraints on 
both sides of the Pacific prevent the 
duplication of the Philippines quasi-combat 
joint "training exercises" elsewhere in 
Southeast Asia.155  
 
Other researchers stipulate that the two are very 
separate phenomena; for instance, Gillian Goh identifies 
the “ASEAN Way” as a “viable strategy for global conflict 
resolution” and having some contradiction with the non-
interference.156 The latter, perhaps, is the reflection of 
the acceptance of varying political and economic systems 
within the regional organization, and absence of strict 
criteria to be a member state thereof. However, it should 
be noted that ASEAN has evolved throughout the last three 
decades into a more solid, vibrant regional institution 
that can be at least loosely compared to the EU and the 
Organization of American States (OAS), which cannot be said 
about the ARF and other emerging mechanisms. Thus, the 
“ASEAN Way” may not be identical to its founding principle 
of non-interference within the ASEAN 10, but the same 
pattern is very consistent with the aforementioned 
                     
155 Catharin Dalpino and David Steinberg (2002): “The U.S. Should 
Support an "ASEAN Way" to Fight Terrorism,” in PacNet Newsletter, No. 
13, March 29, 2002. URL: <http://www.csis.org/pacfor/pac0213.htm>  
156 Gillian Goh (2003):  “The ‘ASEAN Way’: Non-Intrevention and 
ASEAN’s Role in Conflict Management,” in Stanford Journal of East Asian 
Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 1/Spring 2003, pp. 113-118. 
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principle within the broader framework of the ARF, ASEAN+3 
etc. Hence, Southeast Asian regionalism, while being far 
from perfect, nevertheless represents a model for the 
regionalization processes in Northeast Asia.     
However, as is stated above, ASEAN is not a 
perfect organization, nor do its member states possess 
ultimate security assurances and developmental incentives 
from one another and abroad. The common identity is still 
under construction. Southeast Asia’s security is a complex 
and somewhat vulnerable issue. According to Mr. Sidharto 
Suryodipuro of the Department of Foreign Affairs of 
Indonesia, “security [in Southeast Asia] is related closely 
to the region’s open maritime access and the presence of 
all the major powers, combined with a complex history. No 
common and clear-cut security perception exists, and as a 
result a number of regional countries prefer neutrality to 
address the politics of the great powers, others seek to 
engage and maintain balance among these powers, and some 
favor regional freedom of action.”157 He also suggests that 
“the staunchest supporters for regional freedom of action 
are Indonesia and Vietnam.”158 Of these, the post-Cold War 
adjustment of Vietnam into the complex regional security 
and economic cooperation mechanism is used as an example 




                     157 This quote is directed from an interview with my fellow NPS 
student, Mr. Sidharto Suryodipuro of the Department of Foreign Affairs 
of Indonesia. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. March 
05, 2003.  
158 Suryodipuro (2003). 
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 b.  Post-Cold War Adjustment: Vietnam 
Vietnam represents an interesting case of the 
post-Cold war identity construction and interest 
evaluation. Vietnam’s behavior of interactions with the 
USSR and the PRC during the Cold War was characterized by a 
gradual shift from the Chinese sphere of influence to the 
Soviet one. Vietnamese policy toward, and relations with 
the two major Communist powers underwent several shifts.159 
From its establishment in 1945 the new Vietnamese 
government ruled by the Communists was subject to strong 
Chinese influence but had restrained relations with the 
Soviets. Strong cultural ties of the Vietnamese people and 
state to China and the fact that during the First Indochina 
War the PRC was an important ally of Vietnam, served as 
positive factors for Sino-Vietnamese cordial relations.160 
Since the earliest days of the Vietnamese Communist Party 
(VCP), when the party's primary mentor was the Comintern, 
the Soviet Union had played a complex role in VCP 
affairs.161 Historically, however, the relationship between 
the two nations has been characterized by strain, 
particularly on the Vietnamese side, and the record 
suggests several instances of Soviet neglect or betrayal of 
Vietnamese interests.162  
                     159 Ronald J. Cima, ed. (1989): Vietnam: A Country Study. Federal 
Research Division, Library of Congress, p. 222. 
160 On Sino-Vietnamese ties, see William J. Duiker (1983): Vietnam: 
Nation in Revolution. Westview Press, p. 16. 
161 Cima, ed. (1989), p. 221. 
162 This was caused by a number of reasons, among which: Moscow’s 
indifference toward the VCP’s founding in 1930; Moscow’s “silent 
support” of France in 1930-40s; USSR didn’t officially recognize DRV 
until 1950; USSR didn’t support DRV bid for UN in 1948 and 1951; USSR 
supported Vietnam’s partitioning in Geneva in 1954; USSR sponsored a 
proposal to admit both Vietnamese governments simultaneously into UN in 
1956 etc. These examples of Soviet policy reminded the Vietnamese of 
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In the brief intermediary period following the 
war and unification of the country, Hanoi pursued the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with the United 
States. This period was characterized by some void in 
Vietnam’s bilateral relations with major powers – caused by 
deterioration in Sino-Vietnamese relations and still 
emerging alliance with Moscow. The Vietnamese leaders hoped 
to gain both diplomatic recognition from the United States 
and a friendship treaty with Moscow, as a double guarantee 
against future Chinese interference in a same manner that 
they “successfully manipulated Sino-Soviet tension to their 
advantage, obtaining substantial military and economic 
assistance from both.”163 However, this initiative did not 
result in immediate success.164 Thus, through the late 1970s 
and the early 1980s Vietnam entered a full-fledged alliance 
with the Soviet Union. Domestically, this shift was 
facilitated by the decline of political influence of the 
figure who carried most sympathetic attitude toward 
Beijing, Truong Chinh, and rise of the leadership of a pro-
Soviet statesman, Le Duan.165  
However, in the late 1980s the Soviet-Vietnamese 
ties were affected by leadership succession and subsequent 
                     
the peril inherent in placing too much trust in a foreign ally; see 
Cima, ed. (1989), p. 221; and Douglas Pike (1987): Vietnam and the 
Soviet Union: Anatomy of An Alliance. Westview Press, pp. 100-102. 
163 John H. and Mae H. Esterline (1990): How The Dominoes Fell: 
Southeast Asia in Perspective. University Press of America, p. 59.  
164 Both sides had a number of unsolved issues. In the United States, 
the issue of normalizing relations with Vietnam was complicated by 
Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in December 1978, the continuing plight 
of Vietnamese refugees, and the unresolved MIA issue. In Vietnam, the 
war reparations in form of aid were raised frequently in the 1980s 
every time when the normalization issue was brought forward; see Cima, 
ed. (1989), p. 227. 
165 Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet (2001): “An Approach for Analyzing 
State-Society Relations in Vietnam,” in Sojourn, No.2/2001, p. 254. 
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policy reorientations in the USSR. Despite the cordiality 
of relations, the Vietnamese distrusted Soviet intentions 
and resented Hanoi's dependent role; the Soviets in turn 
“distrusted the Vietnamese for not confiding in them.”166 
Finally, Hanoi has taken a more moderate position toward 
China since 1986 and launched economic reforms based on the 
Chinese model, thereby returning to the policy of 
“equidistance.” 
Vietnam’s relations to ASEAN have undergone 
considerable evolution. ASEAN's charter declares that 
membership is open to all states in the region. Before 
Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Cambodia in December 
1978, integration of the three Indochinese states and ASEAN 
into a larger regional organization was discussed within 
the ASEAN community as a possible solution to regional 
problems. The proposal surfaced at an ASEAN summit meeting 
in January 1976, when, following reunification, Vietnam 
requested observer status at ASEAN meetings. It was 
understood at the time, however, that the inclusion of 
communist states within a grouping of free-market countries 
was unprecedented, and the idea was interpreted to be more 
a goodwill gesture than a serious proposition.167 During the 
Vietnam War, each ASEAN state pursued its own Vietnam 
policy. Malaysia and Indonesia maintained strict 
neutrality, whereas Thailand and the Philippines assisted 
South Vietnam.168 Indonesia and Malaysia viewed Vietnam as a 
buffer against Chinese expansionism.169 Thailand, despite 
                     166 Cima, ed. (1989), p. 228. 
167 Cima, ed. (1989), p. 229. 
168 David P. Chandler, William R. Roff, et. al. (1997): In Search of 
Southeast Asia: A Modern History. University of Hawaii Press, p. 443. 
169 Nicholas Tarling, ed. (1998): The Cambridge History of Southeast 
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its tradition of “special anti-communism,” turned to China 
for protection following the war's end and the subsequent 
withdrawal of United States forces from its territory.170 
The 1978 invasion of Cambodia drew the ASEAN nations to 
unite in their condemnation of Hanoi.171  
The Doi Moi reform launched in 1986 marked a 
turning point in the development of Vietnam’s new 
orientation of international relations. In the 1990s 
Vietnam continued moving toward deeper regional and global 
integration. This trend was reflected by mottos put forward 
in successive VCP Congresses: "more friends, less enemy" 
(1986); "be friend to all" (1991); "strive for regional as 
well as global integration" (1996).172 Concluding of the 
Paris Peace Agreement on Cambodia in 1991, in addition to 
Chinese-style gradual marketization reform policy, was a 
major step opening the possibility of Vietnam joining 
ASEAN. This new orientation in foreign policy, based on a 
broader concept of security, led to significant 
achievements in Vietnam's diplomacy in 1995, namely, 
becoming a full member of ASEAN and normalization of the 
relations with the United States. The main goal of 
Vietnam's foreign policy seems to be helping facilitate the 
process of modernization and development, its share in the 
process of globalization. Normalizing and strengthening 
relations with neighboring countries is declared a priority 
in Vietnam's foreign policy, because during the Cold War, 
Vietnam's relations with its neighbor countries were 
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seriously affected and led to mutual distrust between 
Vietnam and ASEAN nations. Furthermore, Vietnam gained the 
reputation of one of the most stable countries in the 
region in the past years. In the multilateral cooperation 
arena, Vietnam realizes that its security and interests are 
closely linked with that of its neighbors, of the region 
and of the world and that it should not separate itself 
from this common trend but on the contrary must make full 
use of this trend for its development.173 Vietnam’s 
priorities include continued promotion of the policy of 
diversification and multilateralization of foreign 
relations, developing cooperative relations with other 
countries with priority given to neighboring countries in 
the region.  
Vietnam’s policy toward China is defined in the 
motto "good neighborliness, comprehensive cooperation, 
long-term stability and looking toward the future".174 In 
many ways, Vietnam’s post-Cold War domestic reforms are 
modeled after those of China, and in the absence of serious 
tensions between the two countries nowadays, the bilateral 
ties are expected to grow steadily. Relations between 
Vietnam and each member of ASEAN, and other East Asian and 
South Pacific nations have also undergone positive 
development. Much of these shifts can be examined within 
Vietnam’s multilateral relations within ASEAN. 
As a result of pragmatic bilateral and 
multilateral approaches, Vietnam not only enjoys trading 
and political relations, but receives crucial international 
aid from donor countries. Vietnam actively participated in 
                     
173 Thanh (2001). 
174 Thanh (2001). 
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regional and international economic integration. As a 
member of ASEAN and APEC, Vietnam seems to be fulfilling 
its commitments within the framework of the ASEAN Free 
Trade Area and the APEC.175  
Vietnam supported a number of initiatives aimed 
at implementing ASEAN agreements focused on regional 
development, addressing drug addiction among the youth of 
the region, and promoting cooperation in tourism and 
culture. As proposed by Vietnam, ASEAN adopted the 
Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI), as well as reforms 
to ASEAN operations and procedures. Most recently, Vietnam 
served in the capacity as Chair of the ASEAN Standing 
Committee (ASC) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (July 2000-
July 2001) and the presidency of ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary 
Organization (September 2001-September 2002). Within this 
framework, Vietnam has focused on implementing the Hanoi 
Plan of Action, aimed at cooperation and external relations 
of ASEAN, and the ASEAN Vision 2020 document.176  
Vietnam has pushed the drafting of the Hanoi 
Declaration on Narrowing the Gap for Closer ASEAN 
Integration, which was approved at the 34th ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting in Hanoi.177 It has tried to promote 
peace and stability in the region by joining ASEAN’s 
concerted efforts to turn the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation into a code of conduct that affects ASEAN 
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members and countries outside the region. Vietnam is also 
taking part in the promulgation of the Rules of Procedure 
of the High Council for the peaceful settlement of disputes 
in accordance with the Treaty, and in the promotion of the 
Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone.178  
In general, it can be said that Vietnam’s identity 
construction was successful and the national interest was 
adequately evaluated and addressed. 
3.  Northeast Asian Interactions: A Distinct Pattern 
In the light of the above-noted accomplishments within 
Southeast Asia, the natural question is whether Northeast 
Asia has increased its plausibility for a more intense 
regional cooperation, as expected of East Asia in general 
or Southeast Asia. On the one hand, the formation of sub-
regional economic zones in Northeast Asia labeled as “one 
big, three small, and one heated” – i.e. general 
cooperation in the region, the Bohai Sea, the Yellow Sea 
and the Sea of Japan Sub-regional Economic Zones 
respectively, and the Tumen River International Cooperation 
and Development Zone, are perceived as “prevailing geo-
economic patterns” in the region.179  Though a trend toward 
strengthening regionalism can be observed here, a fair 
degree of setback and stagnation has also occurred. The 
former Mongolian Prime Minister Rinchinnyamyn Amarjargal 
(1999-2000), stated in The Japan Times:               
 
We have to admit that, so far, existing 
instruments of Northeast Asian [economic] 
                     178 Hai (2002), pp. 183-184. 
179 Lü Zhongwei (1993): “Northeast Asian Economic Cooperation in the 
Post-Cold War Era,” in ISGCC Policy Papers, No.06/1993. 
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cooperation have not fully corresponded to 
the scale and dynamics of the economies in 
the region. … Criticism of the 
unsatisfactory mechanisms for economic 
cooperation comes from the business 
community of the region.180  
 
Perhaps the logical interpretation for the relative 
modesty of Northeast Asian regionalism and efforts for 
integration as compared to those of Southeast Asian nations 
is that the Northeast Asian dynamics cannot be measured by 
the standards and evaluation applied to the entire Asia-
Pacific and/or East Asia.  The key characteristics of this 
sub-region are: (1) Systemic variety in terms of economic 
system – varying from socialist economy to transitional and 
full-fledged market economies; and heterogeneity in size 
and economic development, infrastructure, population 
density, as well as in natural resource endowment; (2) 
Predominance of major players seeking some forms of 
position within the emerging regional framework that 
undermines the existing drives toward integration; (3) As a 
geo-economic sub-region, Northeast Asia does not include 
the entire territory of the two major actors – Russia and 
China, but only their frontier regions, leaving the sub-
region outside of the policy priorities of the respective 
national governments.181 Of these, only the first one is 
identical to those of Southeast Asia and the two other 
factors are unique to Northeast Asia.  
                     
180 Rinchinnyam Amarjargal (2003): “Establishing Confidence in 
Northeast Asia,” in The Japan Times, January 20, 2003. URL: 
<http://www.amarjargal.org/en/index.php>      
181 Hisako Tsuji (2001): “APEC’s Northern Frontier: Northeast Asia,” 
in ERINA, May 14, 2001. 
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The following logical question is whether Northeast 
Asia, possessing the above-listed features, can perform as 
a “developmental zone” operating on the basis of favorable 
preconditions for setting a common security institution. 
For the disadvantages of having a systemic variety of the 
region’s economies, there are also the advantages in terms 
of mutual complementarities. A Chinese scholar stipulates 
that countries possessing diversified market size and 
development can set forth a precedent for a viable, 
beneficial cooperation:  
 
The Northeast Asian economic development and 
cooperation could well establish a new model 
of interest to both academics and 
practitioners. Serving as a model, it will 
facilitate cooperation among developing 
economies and promote cooperation between 
developed countries and developing countries 
as well… Large economic blocs with many 
participants must impose many restrictions 
under agreement. In the [Northeast Asian] 
program, with few participants, policy 
coordination can take precedence over policy 
restriction. This should encourage other 
sub-regional economic cooperation in the 
Asia-Pacific region.182  
 
There is certainly a common interest among the states 
in Northeast Asia. Emerging incentives for free trade 
agreements, and second, growing factor mobility within the 
region, if they continue to develop, can create two of the 
three preconditions selected by Goto and Hamada as critical 
for the regional economic integration. However, in terms of 
                     182 Han Feng (2002): The Chinese View on Northeast Asia Economic 
Cooperation: The Eurasian Railway and China. Report Delivered to the 
Helsinki Railroad Symposium, April 3-4, 2002. URL: 
<http://www.geocities.com/kaky_ry/symposium/hanfeng.html> 
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the third precondition, e.g. comparative confluence of 
macroeconomic variables, largely affected by such 
determinant factors as market size and infrastructure 
development, current diversity is not likely to diminish 
within the short- and mid-term perspectives. Therefore, the 
politics of identity that glues the rationalization of 
interests together must be analyzed in order to reveal the 
upcoming tendencies. Two cases of the three countries are 
selected within Northeast Asia to detect some similar 
patterns of identity construction that produced the 
diametrically opposed results – South Korea/Japan (in 
interrelation) and North Korea.   
a. From Antagonism to Alignment:  
Japan and South Korea  
An interesting dynamic has occurred in South 
Korea-Japan relations during the postwar period. The two 
nations, historically sharing hostile attitudes toward each 
other, which were exacerbated during Japan’s colonial rule 
over Korea, were able to construct a new common identity 
and launch policies to pursue their common interests. From 
1945 on, “Japanese and Korean emotions, openly articulated 
by the two sides, clashed,” based on a number of issues, 
mostly related to Japanese colonial rule over Korea.183 Some 
observers of Japanese-Korean relations, particularly “those 
in the West, have attributed the clash to President Syngman 
Rhee’s truculent anti-Japanese attitude.”184 But the 
situation was to change soon thereafter, and the 
normalization, initiated by the efforts of the then-South 
Korean President Park Chung-Hee’s administration in the 
                     183 Lee, Chong-Sik (1985): Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension. 
Hoover Press, p. 1. 
184 Lee (1985), p. 2. 
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1960s “under strong American pressure,”185 has gradually 
evolved into what Victor Cha refers to as the “quasi-
alliance, in which two states remain unallied but share a 
third party as a common ally.”186 For this section, I 
primarily rely on Cha’s theoretical findings repudiating 
the classical realism and offering an additional dimension 
of social construction. The South Korea-Japanese relations 
appear to be a puzzling phenomenon, bordering between 
friction and amicability: 
 
This endeavor [of the South Korea-Japan 
quasi-alliance] yields two basic findings. 
First, the “normal” state of relations 
between Japan and the ROK is characterized by 
friction. This stems not only from historical 
animosity but also from a fundamental 
disparity in each state’s perceptions of the 
surrounding security environment and 
expectations from the other. Despite the fact 
that Japan and the ROK are not allied, the 
friction they exhibit is a typical of an 
asymmetrical dependent alliance. Second, 
variations from this baseline of contentious 
behavior are a friction of the United States’ 
defense commitment to the region. In 
particular, when there exists a weak (or what 
is perceived to be a wavering) American 
resolve, overarching security concerns compel 
Japan and the ROK to exhibit significantly 
less contention and greater cooperation over 
bilateral issues. However, when there exists 
an asymmetry in the two states’ being 
“abandoned” by the United States, Japan-ROK 
relations return to their “normal” state of 
contentious interaction.187         
 
                     185 Bruce Cumings (1998): Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History. 
W. W. Morton and Company, p. 330.  
186 Victor D. Cha (1999): Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United 
States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle. Stanford University Press, p. 3. 
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The concepts of "entrapment" and "abandonment" 
fears are used by Cha to interpret the changing triangular 
relationships among the United States, South Korea and 
Japan, varying from cooperation to antagonism that were 
persistent from the 1960s until the early 1990s. Cha 
develops three propositions to clarify his concepts: (1) 
"When a state fears abandonment, one of the options it will 
choose is to show a stronger commitment to the alliance in 
order to elicit a reciprocal response by the ally," (2) 
"When a state fears entrapment, it will show a weaker 
commitment to the ally to prevent the ally from being 
intransigent toward the adversary," and (3) "The optimal 
strategy in the alliance game is to maximize one's security 
from the alliance while minimizing one's obligations to 
it."188 These propositions lead Cha into an interesting 
theoretical interpretation:  
 
The quasi-alliance model of Japan-ROK 
relations also provides lessons regarding the 
explanatory power of the Realist view of 
international relations: the Japan-ROK 
anomaly highlights a broader concern that the 
East Asian region presents empirical cases 
beyond the explanatory domain of the 
international relations theories. Interaction 
among states in the region is grounded in 
history, culture, and value system that is 
distinctly Asian. By contrast, the Realist 
view generally assumes interest-based 
behavior drawn from Western experience. In 
analyzing the Japan-ROK case, [this book 
accepts] certain basic Realist tenets but 
also considers the role played by history, 
perceptions, and commitments.189  
                     187 Cha (1999), p. 5. 
188 Cha (1999), pp. 200-201. 
189 Cha (1999), p. 5. 
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This evolution from antagonism to alignment can 
theoretically be explained from varying perspectives. For 
instance, Lee Chong-Sik attributes the positive development 
in the Japanese-South Korean relations to a series of 
international developments and domestic political changes in 
both countries, such as the U.S. policy, increasingly 
aggressive posture of the Soviet Union, turmoil in China and 
the war in Vietnam.190 It can be observed from such an 
analysis that either a common security threat or an 
obligation before a mutual ally obliterated the historical 
grievances; e.g. here both states’ behavior is presented 
merely as responses to the international system. Koon Woo-
Nam names the economic incentives both for the national 
development, as well as for Park’s fraction to consolidate 
its political power, as the motivation behind 
normalization.191 Despite this difference, both authors 
point at what Cha labels as “interest-based behavior.” 
On the contrary, Cha concludes "as deep as 
historical animosity and emotionalism may run, they are not 
in the long term all-determining in state behavior."192 
These statements lead to a form of interpretation what the 
author describes as a “more precisely defined version of 
Realism.”193 However, my argument is that while 
acknowledging the realist pursuit of self-interest by both 
states, the cultural and historic components of their 
relations must be drawn from the constructivist 
                     190 Lee (1985), pp. 68-74. 
191 Koon Woo-Nam (1989): South Korean Politics: The Search for 
Political Consensus and Stability. University Press of America, p. 33. 
192 Cha (1999), p. 232. 
193 Cha (1999), p. 5. 
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conceptualization. In a way, I enlist the metaphors used by 
Victor Cha as “dichotomy between Realism and reality,”194 or 
the one by See Seng Tan and Ralph Cossa as “rescuing realism 
from Realists,”195 e.g. rely on the interpretations of the 
states’ behavior as based on realist interests, but 
influenced by factors that must be addressed via other 
theoretical propositions. The overall evaluation of the 
unique relations between South Korea and Japan is that the 
behavior of the two states has evolved from the realization 
of common interests, which in turn shaped their common 
identity as East Asian, non-communist, free market systems. 
Here the causal mechanism is that interest shapes identity, 
thus the reality was in essence a construction.          
 b.  From Balancing to Brinkmanship: North Korea  
North Korea’s behavior during and after the Cold 
war represents an interesting dynamic of an East Asian 
power-balancing tactic turned into isolation. During the 
Cold War North Korea was able to maintain balanced 
bilateral relations with the two Communist powers by 
shifting loyalties frequently yet moderately - a tactic 
measured by the criteria of benefit and aimed at reducing 
dependence from both.196 P’yŏngyang, in some ways, was able 
to “play the Beijing card against the Moscow card.”197 
                     194 Cha (1999), p. 17.  
195 See Seng Tan and Ralph A. Cossa (2001): “Rescuing Realism from 
the Realists: A Theoretical Note on East Asian Security,” in Sheldon W. 
Simon, ed. (2001): The Many Faces of Asian Security. Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., pp. 20-21. 
196 Andrea Matles Savada, ed. (1994): North Korea: A Country Study. 
Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, p. 257. 
196 Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis and Xue Litai (1995): 
Uncertain Patterns: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War. Stanford University 
Press. p. 14. 
196 Brzezinski (1967), p. 408. 
197 Quansheng Zhao (2000): “China and the Two Koreas,” in Wonmo Dong, 
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Though formal diplomatic relations were established with 
all Communist-ruled governments of Eastern Europe and Asia, 
North Korea did not join the Warsaw Pact and the COMECON, 
while maintaining its membership in the Non-Aligned 
Movement. Bilateral relations with the Communist countries 
were restrained and shifted in accordance with turning 
points in the DPRK-USSR and the DPRK-PRC relations.198 
Throughout the period, cordial ties were maintained with 
Romania and Albania, the two Communist-ruled countries with 
strong nationalist components in official ideology.199 This 
kind of policy, if other variables were successfully 
introduced following the collapse of the worldwide 
Communist system, could have made North Korea a viable 
post-totalitarian society in Asia.  
However, today North Korea not only maintains its 
rigid dictatorship, but is considered one of the four core 
rogue states considered by the United States - along with 
Iraq (until April 2003), Iran and Libya – states that are 
hostile to the West, do not follow "normal" international 
behavior, have developed weapons of mass destruction 
programs and harbor terrorists. Even if North Korea did not 
enjoy a broad range of bilateral and multilateral contacts 
during the Cold War, its relations were not as isolationist 
as in the post-Cold war era. Relations with the two “former 
mentors” – Russia and China - remain undisturbed at the 
official level, but both countries have developed intensive 
and vibrant political, economic and humanitarian 
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198 On North Korea’s relations with the USSR and the PRC during the 
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cooperation with South Korea following the recognition of 
the Seoul government by Moscow (1990) and Beijing (1992).200  
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in August 
1991, North Korea has worked to build a relationship with 
Russia's new political leaders. Its efforts to recapture 
some of the previous closeness and economic benefits of its 
relationship with the former Soviet Union are seriously 
hampered by Russia's preoccupation with its domestic issues 
and new foreign policy priorities. Russia’s renewed 
“doctrine” on North Korea does not oblige its government to 
military assistance to it, with the possible exception that 
it is invaded by a foreign power.201  
More out of economic necessity than ideological 
compatibility, North Korea sought to maintain good 
relations with China, despite the latter's increasingly 
close economic and diplomatic ties with South Korea.  
Throughout the 1990s, North Korea and China reaffirmed 
their commitment to socialism, but at the time China did 
not express clear signals for North Korea's other agenda.202 
Close Sino-North Korean ties continue, but Beijing is 
striving to maintain a balance in its relationship with the 
two Koreas. Although China remains a crucial trade partner 
for North Korea, Beijing's former willingness to assist 
P’yŏngyang economically by extending easy credit is 
increasingly giving way to no assistance and less and less 
extension of credit. Coincidental with the changing 
patterns in its relations with China and Russia, North 
Korea has moved to improve its strained relations with 
                     200 Savada, ed. (1994), p. 257. 
201 The latter provision is vague and abstract that is not taken 
seriously in Moscow; see Savada, ed. (1994), p.202. 
202 Savada, ed. (1994), p. 203. 
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Japan. P’yŏngyang's primary motives are relief from 
diplomatic and economic isolation and monetary compensation 
for the period of Japan's colonial rule (as was the case of 
Japan-South Korean normalization). These issues have not 
been solved, but contacts continue to modestly develop. 203  
Following South Korea's lead, Washington sought 
to reduce P’yŏngyang's isolation and to encourage its 
opening to the outside world and began facilitating 
cultural, scholarly, journalistic, athletic, and other 
exchanges with North Korea after 1988. By the early 1990s 
some exchanges were occurring in these areas between the 
two nations. Seeking economic help and greater 
international legitimacy, North Korea in recent years has 
sought to reconcile with South Korea by promising non-
aggression, reciprocal cooperation, and denuclearization of 
the Korean peninsula. But the regime has repeatedly 
violated such promises. In October 2002 North Korea 
confirmed that they were running a nuclear program, 
declared the Framework Agreement nullified, but has since 
stated that it is willing to negotiate issues over its 
weapons program, on the condition that the United States 
concludes a non-aggression treaty. On the U.S. side, there 
was reportedly a perception that when the United States 
signed the Agreed Framework, many in the administration 
expected the North Korean government to collapse before the 
                     203 Until the late 1980s, North Korea's post-World War II policy 
toward Japan was mainly aimed at minimizing cooperation between Japan 
and South Korea, and at deterring Japan's rearmament while striving for 
closer diplomatic and commercial ties with Japan. Crucial to this 
policy was the fostering within Japan of support for North Korea, 
especially among the Japanese who supported the Japanese communist and 
socialist parties and the Korean residents of Japan. Over the years, 
however, North Korea did much to discredit itself in the eyes of many 
potential supporters in Japan, including harboring of the elements of 
the Japanese Red Army, inability and refusal to pay its debts to 
Japanese traders and other issues; see Savada, ed. (1994), p. 203. 
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promised light-water nuclear reactors would be operational 
in 2003. Rather than a step toward normalization, the 
agreement functioned as a stopgap measure.204 The North 
Korean government, however, has not collapsed. The economic 
embargo further severs P’yŏngyang from the capitalist world 
and reinforces the isolationist faction within the North 
Korean political elite. The motives behind its provocative 
acts, such as its missile launch and missile sales, remain 
controversial. Though perceived by Washington as military 
gestures, these steps may, given North Korea’s severe 
crisis, represent a policy of “brinkmanship” with a sole 
purpose of obtaining a favorable bargaining position to 
meet its economic needs.205 Despite signs of emerging 
contacts with South Korea and the United States in the 
early 1990s, bilateral relations remain minimal and did not 
improve at all by the year 2003.  
On the multilateral front, the two achievements 
that stand out are the admission of North Korea (together 
with South Korea) into the United Nations in 1991 and the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 2000. Involvement in other 
multilateral settings, such as the Non-Aligned Movement, of 
which North Korea was part since the Cold War era, remain 
stagnant both due to the evolving nature of these 
organizations and North Korea’s isolationism. P’yŏngyang 
maintains involvement in a number of UN-sponsored 
development projects and takes part in second track 
settings designed at non-proliferation and developmental 
issues. In spite of these connections, at the governmental 
level the nature of North Korea’s policy remains 
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isolationist even in the multilateral fora. The theoretical 
framework behind this case is that the combination of 
irrationality of interest perception and the construction 
of exclusive identity were the determinants of this state’s 
unusual behavior.   
D.  EAST ASIAN MONGOLIA: IDENTITY AND INTEREST RECONCILED 
1.  Conceptualization of East Asia:  
Construction of Identity and Interest   
East Asia, in the three cases selected for this 
research, offers a unique pattern of state behavior, with 
some commonalities throughout the region. As a case study, 
the selected countries represent three different political 
and economic systems – democracy and market economy (Japan 
and South Korea), transitional one-party state and mixed 
economy (Vietnam) and a totalitarian regime and statist 
economy (North Korea). Their ideological commitments and 
alliances are utterly different. Yet the common thread is 
the construction of their identity, exclusive in one case 
and inclusive in the two others. The causal relations 
between identity and interest have been two-fold in each 
case: perception of interest shaping the identity, and the 
latter, in its own turn, narrowing the policymaking 
pathway. Irrational interest causes exclusive identity and 
a self-perception of “independence without 
interdependence,” whereas rational interest (security and 
economy) leads to the realization of the need to construct 
a common identity. Rational actors do not seek 
confrontation with their would-be opponents. Thus, 
cooperation among the states emerges in the latter case.  
This proposition follows closely the theoretical 
ground of the neo-liberal camp, providing that under 
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certain conditions “cooperation can emerge in a world of 
egoists without central authority.”206 But this can be 
explained by the realist approach, too as “a state will 
attempt [to challenge] the international system only if the 
expected benefits exceed the expected costs.”207 All these 
interpretations echo Morgenthau’s claim that “the political 
realism considers a rational foreign policy to be a good 
foreign policy.”208 Thus, both a binding and a separating 
factor between realist and liberal approaches, especially 
in the case of East Asian statecraft, a construction of 
identity, which, though occasionally hampered by 
irrationality, has been steadily evolving. Whether the East 
Asian construction will evolve into a more robust regional 
organization or not, is a matter of time. Some authors 
suggest that it is not at all impossible, as does George 
Totten:  
 
How about considering a kind of North Pacific 
Treaty Organization (NPTO) or a Northeast 
Asia Treaty Organization (NEATO) (which might 
be easier to pronounce)? NATO started as an 
alliance directed against a supposedly 
expanding Soviet Union, but now it still 
exists, even though it has lost its original 
raison d'être. This means that a NEATO would 
not have to have an enemy, as such, either. 
If such an organization were to come into 
being, it could handle security concerns that 
might arise among its members by 
institutionalized regular meetings aimed at 
making military capabilities and any changes 
in them transparent for all members to 
discuss, so that when any single member began 
to get out of alignment with the original 
                     206 Axelrod (1984), p. 3. 
207 Gilpin (1981), p. 10. 
208 Morgenthau (1948/1973), p. 10. 
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strengths which all members could live with, 
all the other members could exert pressure to 
bring that member back into line. It would 
thus work automatically to self-adjust not 
just the original constellation but 
consciously to work for simultaneous and 
gradual arms control and arms reduction among 
all of its members.209 
 
However, this statement appears to be too optimistic 
for two reasons. First, there are a great number of 
disparities within the region, as addressed in this chapter. 
Second, a common identity for East Asian states is only 
going through the stage of construction, coupled with 
deconstruction of the historical prejudices. The social 
construction of East Asia as a region is being formed even 
these days, based on all three forms of identity. Some 
choose the identification with this region based on their 
primordiality, some on their cultural crystallization, and 
others even on their political construction. These choices 
of identity couple and create a mutually causal effect with 
the perceptions of interest, as the region becomes one of 
the most attractive in developmental terms. Perhaps the key 
asset in the identity construction and pursuit of 
cooperation is the “ASEAN Way” and the principle of “non-
interference,” that helps preserve the sovereignty of the 
states behind the curtain of regionalism.      
2.  Whither Mongolia? 
In 1994 the Mongolian parliament adopted two pivotal 
documents – the Foreign Policy Concept and the National 
Security Concept. These documents are still in effect and 
                     209 George Oakley Totten III (2001): Book Review (of Victor Cha’s 
“Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security 
Triangle.”) University of Southern California Press. URL: 
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serve as guiding principles of Mongolia’s contemporary 
foreign policy, neutral in stance and balanced in its 
relations with the immediate neighbors. However, the so-
called “balanced approach” is not expected to bear the 
desired results for a number of reasons, addressed in the 
second chapter. Nor can the pursuit of a “third neighbor” 
supplement the buffer role between the two major regional 
powers. Being a nation with divergent identity, Mongolia 
faces the challenge of defining the priority in its foreign 
policy that would best safeguard its interests. The entire 
decade of the 1990s has marked a decreasing role of 
Mongolia as political buffer between Russia and China. The 
latter was caused, in addition to the Russo-Chinese 
partnership relations, by the fact that five new 
independent republics of Central Asia now receive the 
buffer role between the two powers. Within this new geo-
strategic environment, Mongolia faces enormous challenges 
in securing its democratic system and market reforms while 
elaborating the ties with the regional states. In terms of 
identity, Mongolia has two options for consolidating its 
efforts toward finding its rightful place in regional 
multilateralism. Of these, the Central Asian dimension will 
likely offer nothing more than a reasserted “bufferist” 
approach, whereas the East Asian direction can serve both 
the security and economic interests of Mongolia.  
In today’s Eastern hemisphere there are the two rims, 
which I name, for the lack of better terms, the “axis of 
prosperity.” These are the Euro-Atlantic and the Asia-
Pacific zones, each pursuing greater intra- and inter-
regional cooperation. For that purpose, the construction of 
a more common, civilization-based identity is underway. 
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Continentalism (in our case - Eurasianism) can serve at 
best as an intellectual haven for social traditionalists, 
political isolationists and economic autarkists. Thus, the 
old competition between tellurocracy and tallasocracy is 
seemingly being resolved to the favor of the latter; and 
for the continental countries like Mongolia, the only 
choice, however controversial it might sound, is to 
bandwagon with the regional development. For that, the 
identity – construction of one and deconstruction of 
another – will play a crucial role.  
Hence, it is my conclusion that the optimal direction 
for Mongolia’s foreign policy priority is that of East 
Asia. From the very beginning of market-oriented reforms 
and systemic transformation of the national economy in 
1990, the East Asian marketplace and cooperation were 
crucial for the survival and evolution of the emerging 
“capitalist culture” in that country. In particular, 
following the disintegration of the Soviet Union and 
separation of Mongolia from the Soviet-led east European 
form of integration, the severe economic challenges were 
overcome not only by the generous aid and assistance from 
the donor countries, but also by the fact that there was a 
developing market economy in China and other robust 
partners within the region. Therefore, by all accounts the 
obstacles presented by the economic disparity should not 
affect Mongolia’s interest in and identity with the East 
Asian region.  
However, even there Mongolia is challenged by a number 
of factors. The country’s population, market size and 
infrastructure development are far behind the other nations 
in the region. Located on the edge of Northeast Asia, 
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Mongolia is too minuscule to be seriously regarded as an 
integral part of the multilateral settings. All these 
factors make Mongolia’s East Asian orientation more 
challenging, but do not deplete its interest and identity 
with the region. The obstacles, mentioned here, are real 
but not irresolvable and as our findings show, some forms 
of diversity, otherwise regarded as restraints to 
multilateralism, can be utilized for its benefit through 
the ideas and practices inherent in East Asia.  
E. CHAPTER FINDINGS 
From the analysis of regional developments in Asia, 
conducted in this chapter, I select the following findings 
as relevant to the issue of correlation of identity and 
interest, and of interest to the direction in Mongolia’s 
foreign policy: 
- Central Asia, as a region, gradually evolves as a 
political, civilizational, and possibly an 
economic buffer located at the crossroads of 
interests of many powers – Russia, China, the 
United States, Turkey, Iran and other Muslim 
nations. Ironically, both due to its strategic 
location and the problems it faces, the region’s 
importance thus increases in the eyes of the 
major players; 
- Central Asian states, as individual nations, have 
done strikingly little to construct a common 
identity or assess their common interests. It 
makes Mongolia’s primordial identity not a 
desired, rational interest, but an irredentism to 
eschew; 
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- East Asia provides a different picture, but here 
the two sub-regions differ much in both the 
states’ behavior and formation of regional 
institutions. For historical and demographic 
reasons, culturally diverse Southeast Asia leads 
culturally rather monolithic Northeast Asia in 
the construction of a common identity and the 
suitable ways of cooperation; 
- Examples of the region’s states present an 
interesting picture. The two Communist-led states 
have chosen different strategies in identity 
construction, and thus, have seen different 
results. If Vietnam’s post-Cold war adjustment 
can be described as a success, North Korea’s can 
at best be labeled as a failure. The difference 
lies in the pursuit of irrational interests vs. 
rational, and the construction of exclusive 
identity vs. inclusive; 
- Japan and South Korea, the two nations with 
emotional antagonism in the past, have gone 
through an interesting process, that can be 
described as an amalgamation of reactive, 
proactive and constructive policies – e.g. 
reaction to the challenges of the international 
system, pursuit of cooperation for mutual benefit 
and realization of the common plight within a 
common civilizational area; 
- Mongolia, despite its location in the reluctant-
to-cooperate part of East Asia, and in spite of 
its relative weakness, has its future identity, 




























 This thesis had explanatory, descriptive and 
prescriptive goals. Based on the findings of each chapter, 
the overarching conclusions can be summarized as: (1) 
evaluation of theoretical propositions, or defining the 
causal relationships between identity and interest in their 
varying types and proposing the primacy of one of them; (2) 
description of regional trends through the prism of 
identity and interest, e.g. determining key features of the 
current processes in Asia, based on the premises associated 
with the theoretical findings; and (3) provision of policy 
recommendations for the Mongolian government and  foreign 
service based on the two aforementioned propositions, 
namely the theoretical generalizations and the description 
of regional trends.         
 
A.  THEORETICAL PROPOSITIONS 
 
The world is changing. This familiar statement 
connotes not only the rapid transformations that the 
world’s nations are undergoing in the contemporary period, 
but also reflects the very nature of human society. The 
world, its constituent units – the states, and the system 
of their interactions – are not static in the sense that 
they have certain intrinsic characteristics attached to 
them. The acknowledgement of this fact makes us rethink 
many traditional premises. As I conducted this study on one 
country’s international behavior and attempted to provide 
its rationalization, the realization of the dynamic nature 
of the world system led me to eschew any school of thought 
in its pure form. Instead, within this research, and this 
thesis as its materialized result, I made an attempt to 
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complicate my own way of looking at states, their behavior, 
and their motivations. In doing so, from among the 
speculative fusion of the realist, the liberal and the 
constructivist approaches, my findings favor a position 
with a strong tilt toward social constructivism. There is a 
common practice to draw an analogy between a state and an 
individual human in explaining the behavior of the former. 
If the realists rely upon the philosophical stream 
connoting the original sinful nature of a human being to 
put emphasis on the self-help system, the liberals, on the 
contrary, put stress on the original divinity of human 
nature that enables the harmony and cooperation among the 
states if the proper institutions are set. I tried to deny 
both, and instead speculate that human behavior is based on 
socialization and learning, and not on an inherent nature. 
Thus, the states’ behavior, in my view, is based on the 
perceptions and reactions to them.             
It is hard to challenge the two tenets of realism 
connoting the state as a unitary and rational actor on the 
one hand, and the anarchic nature of the international 
system, on the other. However, I start with a premise that 
a state in not a monolithic and static unit, but rather is 
a changing organism comprised of a sum of individuals with 
independent judgment and ideas. Therefore, identity, as a 
set of ideas and perceptions by a national community about 
the self, and interest, as a reflection of such identity, 
are equally important in foreign policy. Their causal 
interrelation is an interesting phenomenon. If, on the one 
hand, the former causes the construction of what is 
perceived to be the interest, then, on the other hand, the 
latter, too, can occasionally serve as the pathway of 
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shaping identity. The two seem to be in an inherent, but 
reconcilable conflict; and the reconciliation can be 
facilitated through the neo-liberal approach to regional 
identity and cooperative pursuit of interest. Thus, the 
theoretical proposition I have come to emphasizes the 
primacy of identity in making foreign policy.  
B. REGIONAL TRENDS 
 This thesis is focused on the region as the most 
important setting for small state’s foreign policy. Herein 
I have made an attempt to approach East Asia through the 
prism of the two causal factors in foreign policy – 
identity and interest. Since in my theoretical 
generalizations I equated the two as having a mutual causal 
power and acknowledged the primacy of identity, the 
processes in the region, as well as in Central Asia, are 
approached from this point of view.  In East Asia, the two 
sub-regions differ much in both the states’ behavior and 
formation of regional institutions. For a number of 
reasons, Southeast Asia leads Northeast Asia in the 
construction of a common identity and means of cooperation. 
This originally very diverse region, in which the states 
have had little in common in terms of both identity and 
interest, has come to the construction of, however fragile 
and imperfect, a common identity and thus formulating the 
common interests. Thereby in many ways, as the scholars 
stipulate, the region resembles if not the balance of 
powers, then the “concert of powers,”210 in which each state 
                     210 For additional information on “concert of powers,” see Susan L. 
Shirk (1997): “Asia-Pacific Regional Security: Balance of Power or 
Concert of Powers?” in David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, ed. (1997): 
Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World. The Pennsylvania 
State University Press. pp. 265-268. 
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maintains maximum sovereignty and is guaranteed from its 
outright limitation.  
 Northeast Asia has a number of barriers to such a 
process, including its demographic, political-geographic 
and political features. However, through various mechanisms 
pioneered by Southeast Asian nations, the states in 
Northeast Asia are increasingly being attracted to such a 
manner of international behavior. As Tang and Cossa state, 
“a key social-communicative function of ARF and CSCAP as 
‘talk shops’ may well be to develop a strategic culture in 
which cooperative security can take root; build trust, 
confidence, and reciprocity among member states, establish 
the norm of inclusivity; and socialize states lacking 
significant historical experience in regional security 
cooperation.”211  
 In general, throughout East Asia there is a visible 
correlation between identity and interest – exclusive 
identity promoting irrational interest and vice versa, and 
inclusive identity promoting rational interest and vice 
versa. Overall, despite its incomparability to the European 
integration process, the numerous challenges it faces and 
flaws it maintains, the evolutionary tendency in East Asia 
toward the construction of a common identity and the 
pursuit of common interests is underway.         
C.   POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The primary objective of this work is academic. For 
that matter, I did not aim to justify or criticize certain 
policies of the Mongolian government with regards to its 
foreign policy. However, the thesis was also designed to 
                     211 Tan and Cossa (2001), p. 20.   
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apply theoretical propositions to a particular case, so it 
cannot avoid having real-world implication.  
My motivation for such research is based on my 
personal attachment as a citizen and a patriot of my 
country. The search for what are the vital interests for 
the nation ultimately led to the realization that the 
national interest is a complex phenomenon that cannot be 
assessed as granted. According to my mentor, Professor 
Jigjid Boldbaatar, national interest is “a ‘god’ that helps 
to acquire a prudent stance for the sake of survival in, 
and adaptation to the inevitable process of 
globalization.”212 As the thesis tied interest with 
identity, the assessment of the latter played a rather 
dominating role in the work.        
The thesis has come to a two-fold implication for 
Mongolia. On the one hand, it provided an explanation and a 
justification of the nation’s current de facto policy 
priorities in East Asian multilateralism. On the other 
hand, it stresses the need for de jure affirmation and 
acceleration of such priorities, and calls for a more 
cautious stance in trying to “court” other powers. I 
attempted to predict the counter-productivity of the power 
balance that Mongolia traditionally has been trying in its 
relations vis-a-vis China, Russia, Japan and the United 
States. Contrary to the widely shared belief, I conclude 
that the “third-neighbor” paradigm is not an alternative 
                     212 Translation from Mongolian into English is my own. Jigjid 
Boldbaatar (2001): “Ekh Tüükh, Ündesnii Erkh Ashig” (Mon, “History and 
National Interest,”) in Mongol Ulsyn Ündesnii Ayūlgüi Baidlyn Üzel 
Barimtlalyn Shinjlekh Ukhaany Ündeslel  (Mon., “Academic Rationale for 
the National Security Concept of Mongolia”). National University of 
Mongolia Press, p. 59.   
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policy option, but merely a continuation of the power-
balancing behavior, and that it realistically cannot result 
in security assurance or economic incentives. Thus, the 
most viable identity for the Mongolian nation, the East 
Asian cultural one, and the most pragmatic articulation of 
its rational interest lead to the pursuit of active 
participation in East Asia’s emerging regionalism. If 
during the Cold War Mongolia experienced a trade-off in 
bandwagoning with the Soviet bloc, so does it expect 
difficult trade-offs from bandwagoning with regional powers 
and institutions today. The question is not whether or not 
to avoid any trade-off in foreign policy, but how to 
maximize the benefit from such a policy and minimize its 
risks. In sum, Mongolia has its identity and interest 
reconciled in the region. Although the country actively 
pursues this path, yet it still has to be accelerated.  
There is another dimension to this implication. In 
accordance with the thesis’ proposition that much depends 
on perceptions, the identity construction is not a task 
that can be simply executed by a state, especially for a 
democratic society. In current Mongolia, it is impossible 
for the state to launch the politics of identity, which is 
deeply confined within a civil society. Thus, the matter of 
time and evolution of public awareness is another variable 
that must be addressed. Given both the traditional and 
artificial phobia towards China, any de jure declaration of 
a “Sino-centric East Asia” as Mongolia’s foreign policy 
priority would be a political suicide for any party or 
coalition in power. Therefore, the roles of academia and 
the media are more important and powerful than that of the 
government in the politics of identity. 
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Finally, by stressing the importance of East Asian 
regionalism and the principles of the “ASEAN Way,” by no 
means do I propose any change in the existing domestic 
political and economic practices, which in many ways are 
much more progressive than in many other states in the 
region. Instead, I propose a policy of prudent regionalism 
based on a collective identity as the nation’s foreign 
policy tool, and continuation of a non-negotiable 
commitment to political and economic reforms as its 
domestic policy agenda. Only then Mongolia can safeguard 
its independence and emerge as an integral part of an 
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